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WHERE THERE'S A WILL, THERE'S A
WAY: THE CAUSE FOR A CURE AND
REMEDIAL PRESCRIPTIONS FOR FORUM




"[T]here is a remedy for all things but death, which will be sure to lay
us flat one time or other."1
IRED in the web of forum non conveniens, Latin American
plaintiffs with tort claims against U.S.-based multinational cor-
porations can only hope Cervantes was right and that there is a
remedy for all things, including forum non conveniens. The doctrine's
current application by U.S. courts, before which Latin American plain-
tiffs have asserted their claims, frequently serves only one end: dismissal
of those plaintiffs' claims. The byproduct of such dismissal is twofold, (1)
effectively obviating any likelihood that those plaintiffs will find redress
for their injuries, and (2) effectively shielding U.S.-based multinational
corporations from liability for those injuries. But where there's a will,
there's a way, and this paper proposes that, with regard to remedying the
ramifications of forum non conveniens, there is both.
Initially, this paper will address the forum non conveniens doctrine,
expounding on its policy origins, its current application, and the conse-
quences of the doctrine's current shortcomings. Part I of this paper will
address those policy origins and the current application of forum non
conveniens.
In an effort to demonstrate the formidable basis for implementing a
change in the doctrine's application, Part II of this paper will explore at
length certain systemic problems inherent in the forum non conveniens
analysis and the impact forum non conveniens dismissals have on Latin
•E.E. Daschbach is an associate at the law firm of Siller Wilk LLP in New York
City. She received her J.D. from Tulane Law School in 2001 and her LLM in
International Law from Columbia Law School in 2006.
1. 2 MIGUEL DE CERVANTES SAAVEDRA, DON QuixoTE 61 (Ernest Rhys ed., Mot-
teux trans., J. M. Dent & Sons Ltd. 1943) (1909).
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American plaintiffs' claims as well as corporate liability and, ultimately,
corporate accountability.
Part III of this paper will identify some remedial prescriptions for con-
tending with the problems inherent in the forum non conveniens analysis.
Those remedial prescriptions will be categorized as (1) those that might
be implemented in the United States, (2) those that have been and might
be implemented in Latin American countries, and (3) those that might be
implemented at the international level. Particular attention will be given
to (i) mechanisms for reworking the existing framework of forum non
conveniens, (ii) a proposed new framework for addressing foreign plain-
tiffs' claims in U.S. courts, (iii) Latin American legislative responses to
U.S. courts' application of forum non conveniens, (iv) Latin American
judicial responses to U.S. courts' application of the doctrine, (iv) the pos-
sibility of a multilateral international treaty on the subject as well as con-
sideration of the scope of existing international agreements providing for
court access, and finally, (v) the possibility of establishing an interna-
tional tribunal to contend with foreign plaintiffs' claims against multina-
tional corporations causing alleged injuries in plaintiffs' home countries.
None of the foregoing remedial prescriptions is foolproof, but all are wor-
thy of consideration given the current landscape of forum non
conveniens.
I. THE FORUM NON CONVENIENS POLICY ORIGINS
AND FRAMEWORK
In 1947, and with an eye toward affording the court's license to "de-
cline jurisdiction in exceptional circumstances," the U.S. Supreme Court
unveiled the forum non conveniens doctrine. 2 The case was Gulf Oil
Corp. v. Gilbert,3 a tort action brought by a Virginia resident against a
Pennsylvania corporation. 4 Concurring with the New York District
Court's finding that New York was not the most convenient forum for
disposition of the action, the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the District
Court's dismissal of the action on that basis.5 Importantly, invocation of
the doctrine in Gilbert was with an eye toward fairness. As the Court
observed in Gilbert, "the open door [to courts] may admit those who seek
2. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 504 (1947). The doctrine's origins have
been traced to Scottish common law. See Anne McGinness Kearse, Note, Forfeit-
ing the Home-Court Advantage: The Federal Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens,
49 S.C. L. REV. 1303, 1305 (1998). Its application in U.S. courts "was largely the
brainchild of Paxton Blair, a young associate laboring in a silk-stocking Manhattan
law firm." Jeffrey A. Van Detta, Justice Restored: Using A Preservation-of-Court-
Access Approach to Replace Forum Non Conveniens in Five International Product-
Injury Case Studies, 24 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 53, 60 (2003). Blair's "1929 law
review article.., deplored an alleged crisis in docket overcrowding in the Manhat-
tan federal and state courts of his day and proposed [forum non conveniens] as a
panacea." Id. That "article became the principle source on which the Gilbert
Court relied eighteen years later." Id.
3. Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 501.
4. Id.
5. Id.
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not simply justice but perhaps justice blended with some harassment."'6
The Court was particularly leery of the fact that "[a] plaintiff sometimes
is under temptation to resort to a strategy of forcing the trial at a most
inconvenient place for an adversary, even at some inconvenience to
himself." 7
Both parties in Gilbert were U.S. citizens, but in a later case, Piper
Aircraft Co. v. Reyno,8 the plaintiffs were the estates of Scottish dece-
dents killed in a plane crash in Scotland.9 Forum non conveniens was
applied, and generally thought to be extended, by the U.S. Supreme
Court in Piper to dismiss plaintiffs' wrongful death action.10 The ratio-
nale was again that the chosen forum, though competent, was not the
most convenient. 1
Significantly, and triggering those concerns expressed by the Court in
Gilbert, the plaintiffs in Piper "openly acknowledged that the suit had
been filed in the United States because its laws were favorable toward the
plaintiffs.' 2 At least one commentator remains convinced that, insofar
as "the Piper decision predominantly addresses the role of a jurisdiction's
favorable laws in analysis," the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Piper
"does not expand or modify the narrow premise of forum non conveniens
set forth by Gilbert."'1 3 That is, though Piper is generally considered to
have extended the application of the forum non conveniens doctrine to
the now quintessential tort action brought by a foreign plaintiff against a
U.S.-based corporation in a U.S. court, it is argued that the U.S. Supreme
Court did not, and never intended to, "deviate from Gilbert's policy that
forum non conveniens be used in 'rare' circumstances" only.'
4
On their face, the mechanics prescribed by the U.S. Supreme Court for
applying forum non conveniens mandate a careful inquiry such that it
would seem the doctrine would, in fact, be used only in such rare
circumstances.
Foremost, those mechanics begin with a strong presumption in favor of
a plaintiff's choice of forum, and, ordinarily, that choice should rarely be
disturbed.' 5 Furthermore, the policy behind the presumption in favor of
plaintiff's choice of forum has been fairly clearly articulated.
6. Id. at 507.
7. Id.




12. Leah Nico, Notes & Comments, From Local to Global: Reform of Forum Non
Conveniens Needed to Ensure Justice in the Era of Globalization, 11 Sw. J. L. &
TRADE AM. 345, 350 (2005).
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. See Paul Santoyo, Comment, Bananas of Wrath: How Nicaragua May Have Dealt
Forum Non Conveniens a Fatal Blow Removing the Doctrine as an Obstacle to
Achieving Corporate Accountability, 27 Hous. J. INT'L L. 703, 709 (2005) (citing
Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 508).
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On the one hand, the policy underlying this presumption appears to be
a genuine perception that the plaintiff's choice of forum (particularly
when it is the plaintiff's home forum) is more convenient. As the U.S.
Supreme Court noted in Piper, "[w]hen the home forum has been chosen,
it is reasonable to assume that this choice is convenient. '16 As the court
in Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. expounded, "the greater the plain-
tiff's ties to the plaintiff's chosen forum, the more likely it is that the
plaintiff would be inconvenienced by a requirement to bring the claim in
a foreign jurisdiction." 17
On the other hand, the policy underlying the presumption in favor of a
plaintiff's choice of forum appears to be some genuine interest in respect-
ing a plaintiff's choice. The U.S. Supreme Court concluded in Piper that
"[wihen the plaintiff is foreign," the presumption in favor of the plain-
tiff's choice of forum is "much less reasonable."1 8 According to the
Court, "[b]ecause the central purpose of any forum non conveniens in-
quiry is to ensure that the trial is convenient, a foreign plaintiff's choice
deserves less deference."1 9 But as the court in Cromer Finance, Ltd. v.
Berger20 later explained, the fact that a plaintiff is foreign is not disposi-
tive of the question of convenience. 21 Rather, "'some weight' must be
given to the foreign plaintiff's forum choice, and 'this reduced weight is
not an invitation to accord a foreign plaintiff's selection of an American
forum no deference since dismissal for forum non conveniens is the ex-
ception rather than the rule." 22
The degree of deference afforded a foreign plaintiff's choice of forum
aside, in examining whether a U.S. court is the most convenient forum for
such a plaintiff's claims, "a court first begins by determining whether an
16. Piper Aircraft Co., 454 U.S. at 255-56.
17. Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88, 102 (2d Cir. 2000).
18. Piper Aircraft Co., 454 U.S. at 256.
19. Id.
20. Cromer Fin. Ltd. v. Berger, 158 F. Supp. 2d. 347 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (citations
omitted).
21. See id. at 354. Neither is U.S. citizenship dispositive. See Alcoa S.S. Co. v. M/V
Nordic Regent, 654 F.2d 147, 152 (2d Cir. 1978) ("American citizenship alone is
not a barrier to dismissal on the ground of forum non conveniens"). Citizenship
and residence still play a significant role in the private and public interest compo-
nents of the forum non conveniens analysis that will be discussed shortly. See
Helen E. Mardirosian, Developments in the Law: Federal Jurisdiction and Forum
Selection, 37 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1643, 1660 (2004) (citations omitted). But it has
been recognized by some courts that, by themselves, residence and/or citizenship
are insufficiently determinative of convenience. See, e.g., Wiwa, 226 F.3d at 102
("[In Alcoa], we rejected the proposition that courts must accord 'a talismanic sig-
nificance to the citizenship or residence of the parties,' and held that 'citizenship
[and] residence no longer are absolutely determinative factors,' in the forum non
conveniens analysis"). Note, however, that some scholars do answer affirmatively
the question whether aliens should be treated differently. William L. Reynolds,
The Proper Forum for a Suit: Transnational Forum Non Conveniens and Counter-
Suit Injunctions in the Federal Courts, 70 TEX. L. REV. 1663, 1693 (1992) (arguing
in favor of using citizenship as a determinative factor in the forum non conveniens
analysis in order to conserve judicial resources for the benefit of U.S. citizens).
22. Cromer, 158 F. Supp. at 354.
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alternative forum exists."'23 At this stage of the inquiry, "a court must not
only determine if another forum is available to the parties, but also
whether the forum provides an adequate remedy to the prevailing
party. '2 4
Availability of an alternative forum is a sine quo non for forum non
conveniens, and as explained by the court in McLennan v. American
Eurocopter Corp.,25 "[a] foreign forum is available when the entire case
and all parties can come within the jurisdiction of that forum. 26
As to the adequacy of an alternative forum, it is generally understood
that the alternative forum must be "'adequate' enough to provide plain-
tiffs with a meaningful remedy, or at least a remedy that is not clearly
inadequate or unsatisfactory. ' 27 As applied, that test is construed to
mean that "[a] foreign forum is adequate when the parties will not be
deprived of all remedies or treated unfairly even though they may not
enjoy the same benefits as they might receive in an American court. '28
An example of inquiry into adequacy by contemporary courts is that
undertaken by the court in Martinez v. Dow Chemical Co.,2 9 a toxic tort
case arising out of plaintiffs' alleged exposure to dibromochloropropane
(DBCP). 30 The court in Martinez determined that Costa Rica was an
adequate forum for plaintiffs' claims, noting that "while the Costa Rican
courts' capacity to deal with multi-party litigation and discovery proce-
dures might not be on a par with the United States, it is well-settled that
simply because a foreign system does not provide the same benefits as the
American system it is not considered inadequate."'31 The court cited to a
2001 U.S. Department of State Report, which provided that "[t]he Con-
stitution and law [of Costa Rica] provide for an independent judiciary,
and the Government generally respects this provision in practice," and
"[t]he Constitution provides for the right to a fair trial, and an indepen-
dent judiciary vigorously enforces this right."'32 In the court's opinion,
this was a sufficient indication that the Costa Rican courts would afford
plaintiffs an adequate remedy.33
Having disposed of inquiry into the availability and adequacy of an al-
ternative forum, "a deciding court must then balance the private and pub-
23. Santoyo, supra note 15, at 709 (citing Piper Aircraft Co., 454 U.S. at 242).
24. Id. at 710 (citing Delgado v. Shell Oil Co., 890 F. Supp. 1324, 1355 (S.D. Tex. 1995),
aftfd, 231 F.3d 165 (5th Cir. 2000)).
25. McLennan v. Am. Eurocopter Corp., 245 F.3d 403 (5th Cir. 2001).
26. Id. at 424 (citing Alpine View Co. v. Atlas Copco AB, 205 F.3d 208, 221 (5th Cir.
2000)).
27. Alejandro M. Garro, Forum Non Conveniens: "Availability" and "Adequacy" of
Latin American Fora from a Comparative Perspective, 35 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L.
REV. 65, 65 (2003).
28. Delgado, 890 F. Supp. at 1356.
29. Martinez v. Dow Chem. Co., 219 F. Supp. 2d 719 (E.D. La. 2002).
30. See id.
31. Id. at 735.
32. Id. at 734 (quoting U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS
PRACTICES, COSTA RICA, 2001 (2002)).
33. See id.
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lic interest factors."'34 It is only "[i]f the balance of these factors favors
dismissal [that] the defendant will prevail on its motion to dismiss the
case. "35
As it goes, "[t]he private interest factors focus on fairness and the con-
venience of the parties as they relate to litigation, ' 36 including, for exam-
ple, "access to proof, witnesses, and evidence. '37 Of course, the parties'
interests in these respects will very likely be in conflict. But, as the Court
explained in Gilbert, a certain amount of deference is still owed to the
plaintiff's choice of forum, and the balance in favor of a'defendant must
be a strong one for these factors to override that deference. 38 In particu-
lar, the Court stated as follows:
Important considerations are the relative ease of access to sources of
proof; availability of compulsory process for attendance of unwilling,
and the cost of obtaining attendance of willing, witnesses; possibility
of view of premises, if view would be appropriate to the action; and
all other practical problems that make trial of a case easy, expedi-
tious and inexpensive. There may also be questions as to the en-
forcibility of a judgment if one is obtained. The court will weigh
relative advantages and obstacles to fair trial. It is often said that the
plaintiff may not, by choice of an inconvenient forum, 'vex,' 'harass,'
or 'oppress' the defendant by inflicting upon him expense or trouble
not necessary to his own right to pursue his remedy. But unless the
balance is strongly in favor of the defendant, the plaintiff's choice of
forum should rarely be disturbed. 39
Delgado v. Shell Oil Co.,40 another toxic tort case brought against mul-
tiple defendants arising out of the alleged long-term, work-related expo-
sure of several thousand plaintiffs in twenty-three different countries to
DBCP, is illustrative of contemporary courts' application of the factors
set forth in Gilbert. Emphasizing that "[c]onvenience is the ultimate con-
sideration for a district court in balancing the private interest factors"
under a forum non conveniens analysis,4 1 the court parsed through a lit-
any of factors bearing on what it perceived to be the key issues of proof.
34. Santoyo, supra note 15, at 709 (citing Atd. Tele-Network, Inc. v. Inter-Am. Dev.
Bank, 251 F. Supp. 2d 126, 136 (D.D.C. 2003)).
35. Id. (citing Atl. Tele-Network, Inc., 251 F. Supp. at 136).
36. Id. at 710 (citing Kearse, supra note 2, at 1317-18).
37. Id. at 711 (citing Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 508).
38. See Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 508.
39. Id.; see also Delgado, 890 F. Supp. at 1366
(Although plaintiffs do not cite and the court has not found any similar
authority in the Fifth Circuit, the court will nevertheless review defend-
ants' motion under the higher standard that requires defendants to over-
come the presumption accorded the plaintiffs' chosen forum by proving
that the balance of interests points clearly toward trial in the alternative
forum);
Reynolds, supra note 21, at 1695 (noting that Gilbert "required that the plaintiff
receive a special advantage in a forum non conveniens motion").
40. Delgado, 890 F. Supp. at 1324.
41. Id. at 1366.
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In particular, the court considered (1) the feasibility of questioning
plaintiffs, as well as plaintiffs' co-workers, family members, neighbors, su-
pervisors, doctors, and employers; (2) the feasibility of inspecting numer-
ous documents, including plaintiffs' employment records, plaintiffs'
medical and personnel records, all of which were located in plaintiffs'
home countries; (3) the feasibility of accessing information in the posses-
sion of non-parties, such as plaintiffs' family members, neighbors, super-
visors, and former or current employers as to which a U.S. court would
not be able to compel production; (4) the feasibility of calling foreign
witnesses given the lack of U.S. jurisdiction over those persons for pur-
poses of compulsory process; (5) the transportation costs associated with
bringing those witnesses to the United States to testify; and finally, (6)
the fact that much of the testimony and documents would be in the lan-
guages of the plaintiffs' home countries, such that a variety of interpreters
would be required. 42 For the court in Delgado, these private interest fac-
tors weighed in favor of forum non conveniens dismissal.
43
If, however, "private interest factors do not favor dismissal, a court
must then consider public interest factors," 44 which "focus on the burden
placed on the judicial system and the community if the case was litigated
in the plaintiff's chosen forum,' 45 taking into consideration also "local
interest in having localized controversies decided at home,"46 "the inter-
ests of the foreign forum in adjudicating the case in the foreign courts,' 47
and "familiarity with the law that is to govern and the avoidance of com-
plex conflicts of law issues."'48
On this last factor, Delgado is, again, particularly illustrative. Recall
that in Delgado plaintiffs were from twenty-three different countries,
there were multiple defendants, and the exposure of plaintiffs to DBCP
was alleged to be long-term. 49 Enumerating the public interest factors in
favor of dismissal, the court noted with regard to choice of law that "[i]f
the choice of law analysis ultimately points to application of the laws of
42. See id. at 1366-68.
43. See id.
44. Santoyo, supra note 15, at 711 (citing Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 508; Delgado, 890 F.
Supp. at 1355, 1356). Interestingly, it has been suggested that
[w]hen, based primarily on private interest factors, the court can discern
a forum where the case really should be heard, the decision sounds cor-
rect, in part because the nature of the private interests inquiry-relative
convenience-is a much easier question to address than some of those
raised in the public interest category.
Reynolds, supra note 21, at 1683. Furthermore, with regard to the balance of pri-
vate and public interest factors the forum non conveniens analysis mandates, it has
been observed that "[s]uch a calculation requires, of course, a classic 'apples and
oranges' act," and that "[t]he two types of interests simply are not comparable."
Id. Consequently, it has been suggested that "judges rarely make a real effort to
do such a balancing," and, "if the public interest analysis does not compel a result,
courts generally weigh private interests to reach a result." Id.
45. Santoyo, supra note 15, at 711 (citing Kearse, supra note 2, at 1321).
46. Id. at 711 (citing Piper Aircraft Co., 454 U.S. at 260).
47. Id. at 711 (citing Kearse, supra note 2, at 1321-22).
48. Id. at 711 (citing Piper Aircraft Co., 454 U.S. at 241 n.6).
49. See Delgado, 890 F. Supp. at 1324.
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plaintiffs' home countries to plaintiffs' claims, a trial ... would require a
jury to consider at least twelve different legal standards and to quantify
damages according to at least twelve different measures. ' 50 From the
court's perspective, even that scenario
pale[d] in comparison to the possibility that a jury [might have been]
asked to apply the laws of several states of the United States with
respect to the conduct of some defendants in some countries for
some of the relevant time frame and to apply the laws of some of
plaintiffs' home countries to other conduct of other defendants for
other relevant periods.51
As the Martinez and Delgado examples demonstrate, the forum non
convenience analysis can be a painstaking exercise. But as discussion
transitions here to the basis for implementing a change in the doctrine's
application, it is notable that application of forum non conveniens ulti-
mately rides on the broad discretion afforded to trial courts where there
is no de novo review.5 2 Rather, review of forum non conveniens dismis-
sals is pursuant to a particular brand of the abuse of discretion standard,
inquiring into whether the trial court's determination was reasonable or
not.53
It has been observed that, irrespective of the purported standard of
review, "[a]ppellate courts rarely express misgivings about undertaking a
detailed review of forum non conveniens dismissals. ' 54 In some in-
stances, in fact, appellate courts have reversed district court dismissals on
the basis of forum non conveniens. In In re Air Crash at Taipei Taiwan
Litigation,55 for example, the court concluded "that the district court's
assessment of the relevant factors was not reasonable and, therefore, that
the dismissal constituted an abuse of discretion. '56 Noting that "the crash
took place in Taiwan, the airline is headquartered in Singapore, and the
relevant witnesses appear to reside in Singapore, Taiwan, the United
States, and elsewhere," the court determined that the district court
"failed to balance the competing interests fairly by comparing the domes-
tic forum to a particular foreign forum, and it is unclear which alternative
forum the court ultimately found to be both adequate and more conve-
nient than the domestic forum chosen by plaintiffs. '57
Arguably, however, the looseness of the standard of review applicable
to forum non conveniens dismissals has rendered the doctrine a fairly
50. Id. at 1371.
51. Id.
52. See Dante Figueroa, Are There Ways out of the Current Forum Non Conveniens
Impasse Between the United States and Latin America?, 1 Bus. L. BRIEF (AM. U.)
42, 43 (2005).
53. See In re Air Crash at Taipei Taiwan Multidistrict Litig., 153 F. App'x 993, 995 (9th
Cir. 2005).
54. Reynolds, supra note 21, at 1686.
55. In re Air Crash at Taipei Taiwan, 153 F. App'x 993.
56. Id. at 995.
57. Id.
WHERE THERE'S A WILL, THERE'S A WAY
pernicious kind of "judge-made law." 58 Even proponents of the doc-
trine's current application concede that the abuse of discretion standard
combined with the requirement that a trial court's balancing of the forum
non conveniens factors not be unreasonable has created a "confusing
standard of review"'5 9 and that, at the very least, "[b]ecause the forum
non conveniens motion has such a significant impact on the litigation, the
standard of review should be nondeferential, and expressly so, despite the
costs."
60
II. COMING UP SHORT: REASONS TO REVISIT FORUM
NON CONVENIENS
The current application of forum non conveniens fails on several bases
to deal justly with the tort claims of Latin American plaintiffs against
U.S.-based multinational corporations and, therefore, one or more reme-
dial prescriptions are gravely needed. Before enumerating those failings
though, it should be that noted that some have spoken out in favor of
forum non conveniens, advocating quite seriously for its continued, per-
haps even increased, application to foreign plaintiffs' actions in U.S.
courts.
Professor Russell J. Weintraub, for example, is among the "distin-
guished U.S. proponents of the current most appropriate forum standard
and of the different treatment accorded to foreign plaintiffs. '6 1 In an ar-
ticle addressing the conflicts of law concerns that arise in mass tort litiga-
tion brought by foreign plaintiffs in U.S. courts, he had this to say with
regard to the application of forum non conveniens to those plaintiffs'
actions:
A mass tort suit brought in a state or federal court by foreign plain-
tiffs who have been injured abroad is likely to be dismissed on forum
non conveniens grounds. This is the correct result if one accepts the
arguments, made above, that the law of plaintiff's residence should
be applied.... The court will be relieved of the burden of determin-
ing and applying law with which it is not familiar. Moreover,
favorable United States liability law is only one reason why foreign
plaintiffs flock here. Other attractive features of our legal system are
more extensive pretrial discovery than will be available anyplace
else, superb legal representation available on the basis of a contin-
gent fee, and, perhaps above all, the American jury and its open-
58. Figueroa, supra note 52, at 43.
59. Reynolds, supra note 21, at 1686.
60. Id. at 1688. As Professor Reynolds further explains, in that way, "[t]he trial court's
ruling below can easily be treated as it normally would be treated-as a question
of law subject to de novo review," and "the review could proceed smoothly along
lines familiar to all." Id.
61. Alan Reed, To Be or Not to Be: The Forum Non Conveniens Performance Acted
out in Anglo-American Courtroom Stages, 29 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 31, 63
(2000).
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hearted generosity with other people's money.62
Central to Professor Weintraub's concerns as expressed here is a desire
to avoid U.S. courts becoming "a magnet forum for the afflicted of the
world,"' 63 but his rationale in favor of forum non conveniens extends fur-
ther than a mere protectionist interest in U.S. judicial resources. In fact,
he has opined that entertaining foreign plaintiffs' actions against U.S.
multinationals "places our companies at a world-wide competitive disad-
vantage" 64 compared to multinationals based in other jurisdictions that
do not permit foreign plaintiffs' actions against those companies. And,
along related lines, he has contended that doing away with forum non
conveniens would create a disincentive for U.S. corporations to remain
headquartered in the United States-a fact he has argued would result, in
turn, in a net loss of jobs and economic activity in the United States.65
Finally, Professor Weintraub has advanced the theory that "indirectly
regulating the conduct of U.S. multinationals through forum non con-
veniens would amount to inappropriate interference with foreign coun-
tries' regulatory and legal infrastructures. '66
Professor Weintraub's voice is not a lone one with regard to advocacy
in favor of forum non conveniens. Professor William J. Reynolds has ad-
ded fodder to Professor Weintraub's positions, contending that "[f]orum
non conveniens plays a useful role in our judicial structure," permitting
"the court to search for a better home for the litigation. '67 In his opinion,
"[t]he plight of the foreign plaintiff may be ... distressing," but, not un-
like Professor Weintraub, he notes "that scarce judicial resources, to put
it baldly, should not be wasted on foreigners-especially when the private
interest calculus points toward dismissal, as so often will be the case with
foreign plaintiffs. '68 For Professor Reynolds, "actions brought here by
foreign plaintiffs may 'entangl[e] the forums in suits with which the fo-
rums have at best a tangential connection,'" and, "[a]s a result of such
differential treatment, some might feel uneasy. '69 Professor Reynolds
suggests such a reaction is "natural[, as] we do not like to admit that we
are rationing fundamental resources. ' 70 On the other hand, he contends
that "the need to do so cannot be ignored, and we should, therefore, en-
courage courts to focus on the real concerns animating the forum non
62. Russell J. Weintraub, Methods for Resolving Conflict-of-Laws Problems in Mass
Tort Litigation, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 129, 152-53 (1989).
63. Russell J. Weintraub, International Litigation and Forum Non Conveniens, 29 TEX.
INT'L L.J. 321, 352 (1994) (quoted in Reed, supra note 61, at 63).
64. Id. (quoted in Brooke Clagett, Comment, Forum Non Conveniens in International
Environmental Tort Suits: Closing the Door of U.S. Courts to Foreign Plaintiffs, 9
TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 513, 521 n.53 (1996)).
65. See Reed, supra note 61, at 64 (citing International Litigation and Forum Non Con-
veniens, supra note 63, at 338).
66. Id. at 65.
67. Reynolds, supra note 21, at 1711.
68. Id. at 1693-94.
69. Id. at 1694 (citing Sheila L. Birnbaum & Douglas W. Dunham, Foreign Plaintiffs
and Forum Non Conveniens, 16 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 241, 256 (1990)).
70. Id.
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conveniens decision." 71
Like Professor Weintraub, Professor Reynolds' arguments in favor of
forum non conveniens extend further than an interest in conserving U.S.
judicial resources. As indicated above, he also articulates an interest in
the case being tried where it has the closest connection. He also makes a
case against a kind of "[e]conomic imperialism" he perceives is the conse-
quence of U.S. courts maintaining jurisdiction over foreign plaintiffs' ac-
tions.72 According to Professor Reynolds, "[a] more fundamental
problem ... lies in the export of our ideas about social policy that neces-
sarily would accompany the curtailment of forum non conveniens. '73 He
suggests that "[a]ll law represents a compromise among many policy
objectives," and that if a U.S. court were to, for example, award damages
higher that those that would be awarded in a foreign plaintiff's home
country, that other country's "policy necessarily would be disrupted. '74
In Professor Reynolds' opinion, such policy choices on the part of foreign
plaintiffs' home countries play a role in those countries' ability to attract
foreign business, and the risks associated with those policy choices are for
that country "an acceptable price to pay for attracting" foreign business
in order to "stimulate a depressed economy. ' '75 For these reasons, Pro-
fessor Reynolds urges that "'Uj udicial chauvinism' . . . be replaced by
'judicial comity.' ",76
It is not that Professors Weintraub and Reynolds' arguments are not on
the whole sound ones. But the fact is that the bulk of the arguments in
favor and against the current application of forum non conveniens are
rooted in value judgments.
For example, Professors Weintraub and Reynolds' positions with re-
gard to the economic impact of a curtailment of forum non conveniens,
both within the United States and in plaintiffs' home countries, are cer-
tainly compelling. With regard to that economic impact within the
United States, however, and in particular as to Professor Weintraub's sug-
gestion that retaining jurisdiction over foreign plaintiffs' cases places
U.S.-based multinational corporations at a competitive disadvantage, it is
exceedingly difficult for some to accept an argument based on the equi-
ties purportedly owed to those multi-million, if not billion, dollar corpo-
rate entities over those owed to injured individuals. Regardless, as will
be discussed in Part III(A)(1)(D) of this paper, there are distinct eco-
nomic welfare disadvantages for the United States in permitting U.S. cor-
porations to benefit from increasingly globalized activity with little or no
regulation or repercussions for injuries caused in the course of those un-
dertakings. In addition, there are U.S. consumer protection interests in
71. Id.
72. Id. at 1707.
73. Id. at 1708.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 1710 (quoting David W. Robertson, Forum Non Conveniens in America and
England: "A Rather Fantastic Fiction," 103 LAW 0. REv. 398, 409-10 (1987)).
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retention of jurisdiction, perhaps even irrespective of any immediate eco-
nomic impact within the United States. Finally, with regard to Professor
Reynolds' suggestion that plaintiffs' home countries might prioritize an
economic interest in assuming certain risks of multinational corporations'
activities within those countries over ensuring their citizens' redress for
injuries sustained due to those multinational corporations' activities, the
character of the legislative and judicial responses of Latin American
countries to U.S. courts' application of forum non conveniens discussed
in Part III(B)(1) and (2) of this paper suggest otherwise. 77
Taken together, the value judgments articulated in this paper and the
systemic problems inherent in the application of the forum non con-
veniens analysis might demonstrate a formidable basis for remedying the
current application of forum non conveniens.
A. CONNIVANCE TO AVOID CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY
The ground water in the area is now polluted with toxins that are
known cancer causing agents. The native peoples' children are cov-
ered in growths and the local water is not fit for bathing or consump-
tion. Collected rainwater is their only water supply-and the
rainwater itself was tested and found to contain toxins.7 8
One unfamiliar with the kinds of tort actions forum non conveniens can
be, and historically has been, applied might very well ask what is really at
stake. But polluted ground water, toxic rainwater, indigenous peoples
77. In fact, though determined to be unconstitutional in part, Guatemala enacted a
statute in response to forum non conveniens dismissals that specifically elevated an
interest in human rights. Ley de Defensa de Derechos Procesales de Nacionales y
Residentes [Law for the Defense of Procedural Rights of Nationals and Residents]
(May 14, 1997) (Guat.) (translated in Henry Saint Dahl, Forum Non Conveniens,
Latin America and Blocking Statutes, 35 U. MIAMI INTER-AM L. REV. 21, 48-49
(2003)). In particular, that statute provided as follows:
[U]p to date two cases have already occurred where the application of
the "Theory of Forum Non Conveniens" by foreign judges has negated
the right of Guatemalan citizens to file and to prosecute to an end peti-
tions before foreign courts against enterprises that manufacture and mar-
ket products that are harmful to human beings, although the plaintiffs in
these actions had voluntarily chosen the foreign court. This makes it
necessary to enact a law that controls the applicability of legal theories
unknown in our system and to guarantee the right to justice as a basic
human right.
Id. at 48; see also Model Law on International Jurisdiction Applicable to Tort Lia-
bility (1998), http://www.iaba.org/LLinks-forumnonParlatino.htm (last visited
Nov. 1, 2006) (introducing the model law in order "[t]o protect the environment
and the health of the Peoples of Latin America" and noting that the "law would
benefit the victims of ecological wrongs and, in general, to those who have suffered
damages caused in or from another country" insofar as "those who incur in inter-
national tort liability, will not be able to escape their domiciliary courts and, addi-
tionally, that they will be sanctioned, at the victim's option, whether by the law of
the place where the wrong is suffered, or by the law of the place where damages
are generated").
78. Van Detta, supra note 2, at 95-6 (describing the facts underlying Aguinda v. Tex-
aco, Inc., No. 93 Civ. 7527 (VLB), 1994 WL 142006 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 11, 1994) (in
which citizens of Ecuador sued Texaco)).
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and their children covered in growths-this is all too frequently the grav-
ity of the injuries suffered by foreign plaintiffs in cases where forum non
conveniens is at issue.
Moreover, regardless of the nature of the alleged tort, the egregious
nature of the acts and omissions alleged to have caused plaintiffs' injuries
is chilling. For example, in Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc.,79 plaintiffs alleged
that "Texaco failed to pump unprocessable crude oil and toxic residues
back into wells" and "[i]nstead, . . . disposed of these toxic substances by
dumping them in open pits, into streams, rivers and wetlands, burning
them in open pits without any temperature or air pollution controls, and
spreading oil on the roads." 80 Or consider Sequihua v. Texaco,81 wherein
it was "alleged that for over twenty years a consortium owned by Texaco
and the government of Ecuador used substandard and ultra-hazardous
waste-disposal technology in Ecuador's Amazon region that led to the
contamination of rivers, lakes, groundwater, soil, and air." 82
The list is indeed a long and riveting one, ranging even beyond the kind
of environmental torts at issue in Aguinda and Sequihua. For example,
Dow Chemical Co. v. Alfaro,83 another of the DBCP cases, alleged that
exposure to DBCP chemically castrated banana plantation workers in
Central America.84 It also alleged that "[t]he Shell Oil Company knew of
the dangers posed by DBCP as early as 1958" yet "[i]n 1964 the company
sold the chemical without any warnings."'85 In fact, it was alleged that,
despite a ban on the product in California and a later suspension of its
use issued by the Environmental Protection Agency, "American manu-
factures continued to produce DBCP for sale to Standard Fruit and
Dole," and "Standard Fruit and Dole continued to use DBCP in banana
plantations abroad."'86
In addition to these cases found in the jurisprudence reporters, other
sources contain equally disturbing anecdotes. For example, the August
2003 edition of Trials reported on litigation pending against Bayer Corp.,
Armour Pharmaceutical Co., Baxter Healthcare Corp., and Alpha Thera-
peutic Corp., indicating that "[i]n 1982 there was evidence that HIV was
being transmitted through blood."'87 As the account elaborated, "[b]y
1984, the companies had developed a heat-treatment process that killed
79. Aguinda, 1994 WL 142006.
80. Malcolm J. Rogge, Towards Transnational Corporate Accountability in the Global
Economy: Challenging the Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens in In Re: Union
Carbide, Alfaro, Sequihua, and Aguinda, 36 TEX. INT'L L.J. 299, n.63 (2001) (quot-
ing Plaintiffs' Brief in Aguinda, 1994 WL 142006).
81. Sequihua v. Texaco, Inc., 847 F. Supp. 61 (S.D. Tex. 1994).
82. Rogge, supra note 80, at 306 (discussing Sequihua, 847 F. Supp. at 61).
83. Dow Chem. Co. v. Alfaro, 786 S.W.2d 674 (Tex. 1990).
84. Winston Anderson, Forum Non Conveniens Checkmated? - The Emergence of Re-
taliatory Legislation, 10 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 183, 210 (2001) (discussing Al-
faro, 786 S.W.2d at 674).
85. Rogge, supra note 80, at 303 (discussing Alfaro, 786 S.W.2d at 674).
86. Id. at 304.
87. Christian Harlan Moen, Companies Knowingly Sold Virus-Tainted Blood Products
Abroad, Class Action Claims, 39 TRIAL 72, 72 (2003).
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off any viruses in the product, and stopped selling the untreated version
in this country, '88 but, "rather than destroying existing stocks of the older
product, they sold them outside the United States, predominantly in Asia
and Latin America.
89
Even the wrenching facts of these cases aside, exceedingly troubling is
that "[w]ithout exception, the people . . . injured came from the most
socially and economically marginalized sectors" of their home countries,
and "[t]he corporations involved are some of the largest in the world."90
As one commentator observed in the context of Alfaro, "[t]he poor eco-
nomic situation of [these] countries exacerbated this moral hazard-the
banana-producing countries depended on export revenue from the sale of
bananas to service growing foreign debts."91 As another expounded:
Multinationals often seek out developing countries (host countries)
with a large workforce and an abundance of natural resources for
foreign direct investments while maintaining the parent company in
a developed country (home country). Incentives created by coun-
tries seeking to attract foreign direct investment from multinationals
often include regulatory structures "sympathetic to foreign invest-
ment" because the foreign investments generate jobs, economic ac-
tivity and development for the host country.... Host countries often
have no comprehensive system of corporate regulation or the sys-
tems are ineffective due to lack of resources to enforce existing laws,
while multinational structures allow limited recourse and present ju-
risdictional limitations. Additionally, the host country's government
may favor the economic interests created by the multinationals in-
vestment over enforcement of regulation. 92
So goes the "global race to the bottom" 93 or, in other words, "the pro-
gressive movement of capital and technology from countries with rela-
tively high wages, taxation and regulation to countries with relatively
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Rogge, supra note 80, at 317.
91. Id. at 304.
92. Maxi Lyons, Article, A Case Study in Multinational Corporate Accountability: Ec-
uador's Indigenous Peoples Struggle for Redress, 32 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 701,
728 (2004) (citing Alice Palmer, Community Redress and Multinational Enter-
prises, FOUNDATION FOR INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND DEVELOP-
MENT 1, 5, 7, 8-9 (Nov. 2003)); see also Rogge, supra note 80, at 301 n.6
(One of the main reasons transnational corporations can pursue "accel-
erated development" in countries like Ecuador is because local commu-
nities have little or no access to political or legal representation. It is
hardly an exaggeration to state that where local populations do not have
political power, adequate legal protection of their lands, or cannot access
legal services, oil companies are free to operate much as though the areas
were uninhabited. Where the members of local organizations do not
have the practical skills or resources needed for effective participation in
environmental planning and management, oil companies are spared the
"costs" of local-level democracy).
93. John T. Suttles, Jr., Transmigration of Hazardous Industry: The Global Race to the
Bottom, Environmental Justice, and the Asbestos Industry, 16 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 1
(2002).
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lower levels."'94 It is a kind of socioeconomic poaching arguably fueled,
at least in part, by these two facts: "U.S. courts have consistently pre-
vented foreign plaintiffs from trying their cases in U.S. fora, invoking the
doctrine of forum non conveniens, '95 and the courts in these foreign
plaintiffs' home countries are, generally speaking, simply not equipped to
try these cases. Thus compounded, with regard to Latin American plain-
tiffs, "[t]he effect ... has been to shield U.S. multinational corporations
doing business in Latin America from liability resulting from torts or
product injury caused to Latin American plaintiffs. '96
Foreign plaintiffs' claims have frequently been dismissed on the basis
of forum non conveniens and relegated to the purportedly more conve-
nient forum of their home countries. Thereafter, and due to the practical
obstacles like those outlined in Part II(B)(2) of this paper that impede
Latin American plaintiffs' ability to bring their cases in their home coun-
tries, forum non conveniens "dismissals have resulted largely in that
plaintiffs have been unable to obtain any redress in their cases."'97 In fact,
according to one commentator, "informal surveys show that claims re-
jected in the U.S. under [forum non conveniens] in general have not been
tried elsewhere. '98 Indeed, "[a] survey 'of more than fifty personal injury
actions dismissed under forum non conveniens doctrine [showed that]
only one case was actually tried in a foreign court,"' 99 and
[a]nother survey of one hundred and eighty transnational cases dis-
missed from the United States court for forum non conveniens
showed that "[O]f the returned responses of eighty-five cases, eigh-
teen cases were not pursued further in the foreign forum, twenty-two
settled for less than half the estimated value, and in twelve, the
United States attorneys had lost track of the outcome. Most impor-
tantly, none of the reported cases proceeded to a courtroom victory
from the foreign forum." 100
Admittedly, more recently, "U.S. courts have contrived the mechanism
of conditional ... dismissals"'1 1 based on forum non conveniens. In gen-
eral, these dismissals endeavor to remove certain barriers to plaintiffs re-
filing their claims in their home countries and, in some cases, endeavor to
explicitly afford plaintiffs the opportunity to return to the U.S. court if
the stated conditions are not met. These dismissals might include, for
94. Id. at 7 (quoting Debora L. Spar & David B. Yoffie, Multinational Enterprises and
the Prospects for Justice, 52 J. INT'L Ant. 557, 564 (1999)).
95. Figueroa, supra note 52, at 42.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 45.
98. Id.
99. Id. (quoting Himly Ismail, Forum Non Conveniens, United States Multinational
Corporations, and Personal Injuries in the Third World: Your Place or Mine?, 11
B.C. THIRD WORLD L. J. 249, 250 n.7 (1991)).
100. Id. (quoting Jacqueline Duval-Major, One-Way Ticket Home: The Federal Doctrine
of Forum Non Conveniens and the International Plaintiff, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 650,
672 (1992)).
101. Figueroa, supra note 52, at 43.
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example, the "waiver of defendant's statute of limitations defense,"'10 2 de-
fendant's consent to "liberal, U.S.-style discovery," 10 3 and even "the re-
quirement that the foreign forum retain jurisdiction over the case. 104
It would seem that foreign plaintiffs might gain some ground on the
bases of a dismissal conditioned on such factors, again, due to the practi-
cal obstacles like those outlined in Part II(B)(2), but such conditions are
probably rarely even tested. As this paper explores in Part II(B)(2), "the
cost, time, and personal risk of pursing a claim dismissed from an Ameri-
can courtroom is so great that plaintiffs can rarely justify the reinstate-
ment of their erstwhile valid claims abroad."'01 5 As such, it has been
suggested that these conditional dismissals really amount to little more
than license for a court to:
[B]ask in the illusion that it has fairly "balanced" the interests of
the ... courts with those of international plaintiffs, while in reality all
the ... judges have done is to subcontract the case to a forum that is
more convenient for the ... court and from which the case is unlikely
to emerge. 106
Against this backdrop, and recalling that the defendants at issue are
U.S.-based multinational corporations, it has been asserted that forum
non conveniens dismissals of foreign plaintiffs' tort actions against those
defendants "raise serious questions about the ethics of a legal system
which permits [transnational corporations] to establish operations in de-
veloping countries, but at the same time restricts the victims of industrial
and environmental hazards from seeking a remedy in the home country
of the offending corporation.' 1 7 An exceedingly cynical, but also realis-
tic, view is that "the transnational corporation benefits from the 'best of
both worlds." ' 108 As the argument goes, "[t]he corporation is able to
reap financial benefits that indirectly result from operating in a country
where citizens are excluded from the political-legal system" while, "[a]t
the same time, the corporation is able to insulate itself from any actions
that, in the rare instance, may be brought against the company in home-
country courts." 109
In light of these consequences of the current application of forum non
conveniens, some have argued broadly that "[t]he tort reform and envi-
ronmental movements may have found their greatest ally in the U.S. judi-
102. Id.; see also USHA (India), Ltd. v. Honeywell Int'l, Inc., 421 F.3d 129, 136 (2d Cir.
2005) (conditioning dismissal on "defendants' waiving any statute-of-limitations
defense that would bar this case, if promptly hereafter commenced, from being
heard in an Indian forum").
103. Figueroa, supra note 52, at 43.
104. Id.
105. Christopher M. Marlowe, Comment, Forum Non Conveniens Dismissals and the
Adequate Alternative Forum Question: Latin America, 32 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L.
REV. 295, 298 (2001) (citing Ismail, supra note 99, at 250 n.7).
106. Van Detta, supra note 2, at 103.
107. Rogge, supra note 80, at 300.
108. Id. at 301.
109. Id.
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ciary's endorsement of the doctrine of forum non conveniens." 1 0 That is,
the application of forum non conveniens to foreign plaintiffs' tort actions
against U.S.-based multinational corporations affords those corporations
room to operate without reference to environmental and product manu-
facturing regulations, in the end "saving companies millions of dollars in
outside legal costs defending suits in the United States, while providing
multinational corporations with a fantastic recycling bin for their prod-
ucts for years to come." 111
It can hardly be argued that globalization is upon us. In fact, it has
been determined that "[s]ince the 1990s, the world economy has grown at
an annual rate of over 3 percent," while "trade increased 6 percent." 112
As one commentator aptly observed, however, "[t]he world has changed,
but the doctrine of forum non conveniens remains static. '113
These days, "[miultinational corporations often wield more power than
many of the world's nations, the immense wealth and political influence
of multinationals make them powerhouses in the global economy. '114
Unfortunately, consistent with that power is "the greatest capacity to
cause harm to people and the environment on a global scale and to use
political, financial and legal leverage to avoid being brought to ac-
count. 11 5 It might be argued that, also consistent with that power,
should be "social and environmental responsibilities to the peoples and
environs from which their enterprises profit and that demand legal rem-
edy when breached."1 1 6 The syllogism is not a difficult one:
110. Marlowe, supra note 105, at 319. In fact, it has been suggested that rather grimly
ironic advice to multinational corporations might read something like this:
Executives should create shell companies abroad, vest them with author-
ity and provide them with just enough capital to remain solvent in carry-
ing out the parent company's directives from the United States. Indeed,
corporate headquarters in the United States should become nothing
more than the administrative work stations which laboriously implement
ingenious strategies conceived and fostered in humid second floor offices
abroad. If the forum non conveniens analysis is as stringent as forwarded
by recent courts, any corporation with the means to establish a ware-
house for important documents and conference rooms elsewhere should
do so immediately.
Id.
111. Id. at 319-20. One commentator has even argued that "[multinationals] not only
manufacture and distribute products and engage in business activities that injure
people from abroad; their lack of accountability in U.S. courts has emboldened
some ... to conspire with repressive foreign governments in suppressing any dis-
sent that may encumber their mutual objectives." Van Detta, supra note 2, at 57
(citing Alex Markels, Showdown for a Tool in Rights Lawsuits, N.Y. TIMES, June
15, 2003, at Business 11 (regarding the Myanmar government's role in human
rights abuses committed by a company constructing a natural gas pipeline in
Myanmar)).
112. Nico, supra note 12, at 354 (citing Steven Waldhorn, On the Wrong Track, SOCIAL
POLICY, June 22, 2002, at 3).
113. Id. at 345.
114. Lyons, supra note 92, at 701.
115. Id. at 727 (quoting Palmer, supra note 92, at 2).
116. Id. at 702.
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[E]thical responsibilities of transnational businesses do not end at
national borders, even if some corporate strategists would like it to
be that way. Ethics and economics are utterly inseparable. As the
global economy evolves, so too must our ethical expectations, and
hence our laws and legal traditions .... If a corporation's economic
activity moves across national borders, then so must its sense of
moral responsibility, and so must the personal ethics of those in-
volved in the decision-making process.1 17
Accepting that premise as true, and "[a]s the global economy becomes
more integrated, the frequent use of the doctrine of forum non con-
veniens raises important legal, ethical, and political concerns."' 18 Some
have even argued that the attenuation of those concerns, in turn, com-
promises global economic viability. That is, "[t]he long-term viability of
the global economy may rest on whether human rights are allowed to
expand along with the economic freedoms that attend globalization."' 19
The particular U.S. interest in adjudicating Latin American plaintiffs'
tort claims against U.S.-based multinational corporations will be taken up
in Part III(A)(1)(D) of this paper. For now, conceding the force of argu-
ments made by proponents of forum non conveniens such as Professors
Weintraub and Reynolds, this paper takes the position that the current
application of forum non conveniens does attenuate significant legal, eth-
ical, and political concerns insofar as it results not only in denial of jus-
tice120 "but connivance to avoid corporate accountability." 121 This paper
takes the position that such is a formidable basis on which to institute
change.
B. FANTASTIC FICTION: THE REALITY OF AVAILABILITY
AND ADEQUACY
In light of those survey results noted in Part II(A) above, the surveyor
himself concluded that "pretending that [forum non conveniens] dismis-
sals are not outcome-determinative is a rather fantastic fiction. '122 In
many respects so too is the forum non conveniens analysis. As discussed
in Part I above, application of the forum non conveniens doctrine is said
to rest on "two pillars," "a showing that the foreign alternative forum is
117. Rogge, supra note 80, at 316-17.
118. Id. at 300.
119. Nico, supra note 12, at 360.
120. Denial of justice is a term of art in international law. As provided in the Restate-
ment (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States section 711, comment
(a), the phrase is commonly used to refer "to injury consisting of, or resulting
from, denial of access to courts, or denial of procedural fairness and due process in
relation to judicial proceedings, whether criminal or civil." RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 711, comment (a)
(1987). To the extent forum non conveniens dismissals might result in a foreign
plaintiff's inability to seek redress for her or his injuries, the phrase is apropos
here.
121. Alfaro, 786 S.W.2d at 680 (Doggett, J., concurring).
122. Figueroa, supra note 52, at 45.
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'available' . . . and 'adequate."' 123 In many cases, though, a more realistic
inquiry reveals that the purportedly more convenient alternative forum is
neither available nor adequate-far from it.
1. Availability
Foremost, as to the availability of the alternative forum, Latin Ameri-
can countries' understanding of jurisdiction might operate as a bar to
plaintiffs refiling their cases in their home countries once those cases have
been dismissed by U.S. courts.12 4
In particular, "[u]nder the civilian jurisdictional scheme, a court either
has or does not have jurisdiction, and if the case is properly filed before a
court of competent jurisdiction, such a court does not have discretion to
dismiss the case and transfer it to another forum."t 25 The understanding
is that the choice of forum is the plaintiff's, and that choice, "once exer-
cised, cannot be disturbed or twisted by a court of law.' 26
In fact, one commentator notes that, in some Latin American coun-
tries, "[tlhe rule is that the defendant's place of domicile or business, or
where the injury occurred determines the court's jurisdiction"'127 and that
"[a]fter the court of the defendant's domicile has acquired jurisdiction,
such jurisdiction cannot be disturbed by the parties or by the court it-
self."'1 28 In that commentator's appreciation of Latin American jurisdic-
tional rules, "once a plaintiff has decided to sue a U.S. defendant in the
court of the defendant's domicile, Latin American courts have lost...
their right to hear that case.' 2 9
Regardless, even in those Latin American countries where a plaintiff is
permitted "to waive his or her right to sue at the defendant's domicile"
and might even "change his or her mind and divert a case to one of the
forums claiming competence over the case, even after having brought the
case before a different court," "[s]uch change of venue ought to be made
123. Garro, supra note 27, at 65.
124. Initially, it has been observed that the U.S. understanding of the word jurisdiction
is significantly broader than that in civil law systems, including Latin American
systems. See Fernando Alejandro Vizquez Pando, Mexican Law of Judicial Com-
petence, 12 Hous. J. INT'L L. 337, 337 (1990) ("the English word jurisdiction refers
to all competences of the state and each one of its organs, while the Spanish word
jurisdicci6n, and its equivalents in other European languages, have a meaning re-
stricted to the exercise of the judicial function").
125. Garro, supra note 27, at 69 (citing CODIGO PROCESAL CIVIL [COD. PROC. Civ.] art.
31 (Costa Rica) pursuant to which "[i]f there were two or more courts with juris-
diction for one case, it will be tried by the one who heard it first at plaintiffs
request").
126. Id.
127. Figueroa, supra note 52, at 44; see also Garro, supra note 27, at 70 n. 8 (noting that
"[iun a few civil law jurisdictions, the right to bring suit before the courts of the
defendant's forum may not even be waived" and citing CODIGO PROCESAL CIVIL Y
MERCANTIL [COD. PROC. CIV. & MERC.] arts. 16-17 (Guat.)).
128. Figueroa, supra note 52, at 44.
129. Id.
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freely, unequivocally, and voluntarily by the plaintiff.' 30 Thus, as one
commentator ably observed regarding U.S. courts' attempts to transfer
cases to foreign plaintiffs' home countries:
[A]cceptance of such transfer may be regarded not only against the
transferee court's own public policy, but inimical to the transferee's
law and public policy of allowing the plaintiff to decide whether to
bring a tort action before the courts of the place where the wrong
was committed or the injury was suffered or, alternatively, to sue
before the courts of defendant's domicile.131
The logic is that plaintiffs' submission of their cases to courts in their
home countries "is not 'voluntary' if plaintiff's appearance responds only
to an order of a U.S. court upon dismissal of the case on [forum non
conveniens] grounds. 1 32 "[C]ourts in Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala,
and Panama have declined jurisdiction over claims which their own na-
tionals decided to bring in the United States after those claims had been
dismissed by U.S. courts on the grounds of [forum non conveniens]. 133
In those instances where such an outcome in the alternative Latin
American forum is conceivable, there are no grounds for concluding the
alternative forum is available.
2. Adequacy
Compared to the question of availability of the alternative forum, the
question of adequacy is a more delicate undertaking. For U.S. courts, this
is true if for no other reason than political relations between the United
States and a given Latin American country might be at stake, and U.S.
courts might be reluctant to cast judgment on the adequacy of that coun-
try's judicial system for fear of compromising those relations. Indeed,
issues of comity are almost unavoidable in matters of international litiga-
tion.1 34 But there is such ample evidence demonstrating that because, in
many cases, alternative fora in Latin America are not adequate to adjudi-
cate Latin American plaintiffs' claims against U.S.-based multinational
corporations, it is arguable that such issues of comity might need to be
130. Garro, supra note 27, at 70 (citing CODIGO PROCESAL CIVIL Y MERCANTIL [COD.
PROC. CIV. & MERC.] arts. 16-17 (Guat.)).
131. Id. at 75.
132. Id. at 77-78.
133. Id. at 75 (citing Abarca v. Shell Oil Co., No. 353-95 (4th Civ. Court, Costa Rica,
Sept. 1, 1995); Merelo v. Dole Food Co. (19th Civ. Court of First Instance of
Naranajal, Ecuador, Mar. 16, 1999); Villeda (7th Court of First Instance on Civil
Matters, Guat., Aug. 17, 1995); Morales v. Shell Oil Co. (2d Civ. Cir. Court of the
1st Judicial Cir., Pan., Oct. 6, 1995).
134. See, e.g., Ahmad v. Wigen, 910 F.2d 1063, 1066-67 (2d Cir. 1990)
([i]t is not the business of our courts to assume the responsibility for
supervising the integrity of the judicial system of another sovereign na-
tion.... The interests of international comity are ill-served by requiring a
foreign nation such as Israel to satisfy a United States district judge con-
cerning the fairness of its laws and the manner in which they are
enforced).
WHERE THERE'S A WILL, THERE'S A WAY
put aside. 135
There is a list of shortcomings in many Latin American legal systems as
well as fundamental differences between those civil law systems and the
U.S. common law system, all of which arguably impede adequate adjudi-
cation of the particular kinds of claims at issue in this paper. Culled from
a list of elements U.S. courts actually have taken into consideration when
evaluating whether a Latin American forum is adequate, that list includes
the following:
(i) the inexistence of pre-trial discovery in Latin American civil pro-
cedures; (ii) restrictions on testimonial evidence, especially the lack
of a right to cross-examination; (iii) restrictions on the free availabil-
ity of expert testimony and documentary evidence; (iv) nonexistence
of a right to a jury trial in civil cases; (v) heavy limitations on third
party practice and inexistence of class actions in civil cases; (vi)
weakness of substantive rules on tort liability, such as restrictive
rules on indemnity or contribution from third parties; lack of rules
on strict liability in product liability cases; lack of stare decisis in
Latin America thus limiting a uniform construction of statutes con-
cerning civil tort liability; low amounts for ... award[s]... ; ... and
restrictions on the grounds for non-monetary damage compensa-
tions; (vii) litigation taxes as a pre-condition for filing complaints;
(viii) restrictions on contingent fee agreements; (ix) judicial wor-
kloads and unreasonable delays; (x) political issues related to judicial
corruption and lack of impartiality and independence; devaluation of
money awards denominated in Latin American currencies; and the
imposition of currency and exchange rate restrictions; (xi) other
practical limitations include the lack of judicial training and expertise
in highly complicated legal issues; the deficient working facilities and
understaffed courts; lack of technology; lack of economic resources
to obtain evidence; and the general unavailability of high quality-
translation services.1 36
Added to these is the veritably incomparable congestion of Latin
American courts;137 the highly complex, time-consuming, and expensive
135. Though without a robust judiciary to enforce them they are not capable of achiev-
ing much, from a substantive relief perspective it is interesting to note that, as
trade increases between the United States and Latin American countries, "Latin
American national legislatures, courts, and legal writers advocate the broadening
of consumer rights to recover damages in product liability claims" in Latin
America. Philip A. Robbins, Report on the National Law Center for Inter-Ameri-
can Free Trade's Miami Conference on Product Liability, 20 ARIZ. J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 43, 44 (2003). In fact, consumer protection laws to that effect are crop-
ping up in Latin America with more frequency. See id.
136. Figueroa, supra note 52, at 44 (citing Duval-Major, supra note 100, at 671).
137. In In re Bridgestoneffirestone, Inc., for example, "[p]laintiffs attorneys explained
that according to the World Bank, Venezuelan courts had an estimated backlog of
two to three million cases." Manuel A. Gomez, Like Migratory Birds: Latin Amer-
ican Claimants in U.S. Courts and the Ford-Firestone Rollover Litigation, 11 Sw.
J.L. & TRADE AM. 281, 299-300 (2005) (discussing In re Bridgestone/Firestone,
Inc., 190 F. Supp. 2d 1125 (S.D. Ind. 2002). Identified causes for backlogs like
those in Venezuela include the fact that, generally speaking, in Latin America,
"cases settle less frequently," "the judge must preside over all the evidence,"
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procedures for obtaining service of process under most Latin American
codes of civil procedure; 138 the fact that the jurisdiction of Latin Ameri-
can courts may not extend to reach the assets of U.S.-based multinational
corporate defendants even if a judgment could be obtained in a Latin
American court;139 and the fact that in Latin American legal systems, the
losing plaintiff in an action is responsible for the winner's fees. 140
Whether categorized as failings in Latin American legal systems or sim-
ply distinctions between those systems and the U.S. system, taken to-
gether, these factors pose an almost insurmountable obstacle to Latin
American plaintiffs bringing their claims against U.S.-based multinational
corporations in Latin American courts. The nuances of some of these
factors are sufficiently subtle and/or their impact on the viability of plain-
tiffs' claims is sufficiently substantial to warrant particularized attention
here.
a. Limitations on Discovery and Evidence
The approach to discovery and evidence in Latin American legal sys-
tems is strikingly different than that in the U.S. system.14' In Latin
American legal systems, there are generally no depositions, and docu-
ment discovery is exceedingly limited. 142 In fact, the power to compel
document production in Latin America has been described as relatively
feeble inasmuch as "broad categories of documents are considered 'pri-
vate"' and, as such, beyond the reach of the court's compulsion pow-
ers, 143 and "no sanctioning power attends the issuance of a subpoena." 144
Moreover, to actually discover documentary evidence, oftentimes a party
"must indicate to the court the specific documents sought, what type of
"codes of civil procedure are truly ancient and inefficient," and "strikes of judicial
employees can close the courts for weeks, or even months, at a time." Dahl, supra
note 77, at 41-42.
138. See Dahl, supra note 77, at 40.
139. See id. at 33.
140. See id. at 41.
141. In fact, as a general matter, "proof in the US carries more weight and is much
easier to obtain than in Latin American systems." Id. at 37. At least one commen-
tator blasts Latin American rules on the subject as being "structurally weak and
very restrictive." Id.
142. See id. at 38.
143. Id. at 39. See, e.g., Law for Searching, Seizing, and Evaluating Private Documents
and Interfering with Communications, Law No. 7425, Aug. 1, 1994 (Costa Rica).
This law provides for inspection of private documents only when absolutely neces-
sary and defining private documents to include
letters, correspondence sent by fax, telex, telemetric or other means,
videos, cassette tapes, magnetic tapes, records or disks, diskettes, writ-
ings, books, briefs, records or registrations, blueprints, drawings, paint-
ings, X-rays, photographs, and any other form of recording information
of a private nature, used with a representative or declarative intent to
illustrate or prove something.
Dahl, supra note 77, at 39. See also Antonio Gidi, Class Actions in Brazil-A
Model for Civil Law Countries, 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 311, 319 (2003) (describing
Brazilian discovery matters).
144. Garro, supra note 27, at 86.
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information such document likely contains, and where it is likely
found.' 45 In other words, discovery as it is understood in Latin
America, is less a fact-finding expedition than a narrow window of oppor-
tunity to corroborate what is already known.
Even the limits on discovery aside, the evidentiary process itself might
be said to hamper civil plaintiffs in Latin America. In particular, the call-
ing of witnesses is restricted in significant ways, including strict numerical
limits and the exclusion of the parties themselves as well as the parties'
spouses, close family members, friends, enemies, employees, "or anyone
having a direct or an indirect interest in the outcome of the case."' 146 Fur-
thermore, permissible witnesses may generally only be questioned before
a judge or the judge's clerk by way of written question submitted in ad-
vance and without the possibility of cross-examination. 147 Finally, expert
witnesses are often appointed by the courts, irrespective of the parties'
rights to appoint their own. 148
One commentator calculates that, based on limitations such as the fore-
going, "it would not be an exaggeration to estimate that if a case were
transferred to a Latin American jurisdiction, the evidence obtainable
would be at least 80% weaker than if the case remained in the US.1 49
Really tallying up the limitations discussed, that estimation may even be a
bit optimistic. Still, if a forum's procedural rules afford access to only 20
percent of the evidence, a determination that the form is adequate does
seem somewhat specious.
b. Nonexistence of Class Actions
Few would argue with the proposition that "[t]he different devices
adopted in the United States.. . to process large scale litigation and com-
plex cases certainly have no equal in other countries. 1 5 0 In fact, it has
been observed that
[a] variety of mechanisms like class action, multi-district litigation,
formal consolidation, informal aggregation and bankruptcy have per-
mitted American courts to respond to the emergence of cases involv-
ing large-scale accidents and disasters, financial fraud, product
liability and other litigation involving hundreds - or even thousands -
of claimants, several defendants, and very complicated issues.1 51
145. Id. at 92.
146. Dahl, supra note 77, at 38 (citing CODE CIVIL [C.C.] art. 407 (Braz.); CODE CIVIL
[C. civ.] art. 1317 (Nicar.)).
147. See Garro, supra note 27, at 92.
148. See Dahl, supra note 77, at 39 (citing CODE CIVIL [C. civ.] art 458 (Costa Rica)).
149. Id. at 37.
150. Gomez, supra note 137, at 282 (citing Symposium, Implied "Consent" to Personal
Jurisdiction in Transnational Class Litigation, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 619, 625
(2004); Antonio Gidi, supra note 143, at 313; Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Debates Over
Group Litigation in Comparative Perspective: What Can We Learn From Each
Other?, 11 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L 157, 159 (2001)).
151. Id. (citing Deborah R. Hensler, Revisiting the Monster: New Myths and Realities of
Class Action and Other Large Scale Litigation, 11 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L 179, 182
(2001)).
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Latin American courts, in contrast, are neither equipped nor inclined
to handle mass tort litigation or class actions. As summarized by one
commentator, "[t]he legal tradition and the training of lawyers and judges
in Latin America is focused on the traditional bipolar model of litigation,
one against one, incident by incident. 15 2 Furthermore, there is an ex-
ceedingly limited perception of judicial authority such that a Latin Amer-
ican judge would not be "prepared, and probably not willing, in the
absence of very precise legislative directives, to exercise the choices and
responsibilities required to manage mass tort cases, involving dozens,
hundreds and even thousands of plaintiffs harmed by multinational
corporations."' 53
The closest mechanism available in Latin American courts is a proce-
dure that permits physical consolidation of cases in one court. 154
But"[t]hese rules do not contemplate.., the collective treatment of hun-
dreds of plaintiffs as a unified whole. '155 Rather, though their cases may
be consolidated, plaintiffs are still treated independently such that even
"the common facts pointing to the defendants' misconduct must be estab-
lished by each plaintiff. 1 56
The lack of the requisite legal culture and procedural mechanisms to
handle mass tort litigation and class actions is particularly detrimental to
Latin American plaintiffs whose tort actions against U.S.-based multina-
tional corporations have been dismissed by U.S. courts. This is because
these actions often involve hundreds, if not thousands, of plaintiffs, and
dismissal of their actions might result in the atomization of cases where
plaintiffs are the nationals of several Latin American countries. 157
The forum non conveniens dismissal of the U.S. action in Delgado, for
example, "led to the atomization of the litigation as thousands of suits
were filed in hundreds of courts across twenty-three affected foreign
countries. ' 158 Such diffusing of plaintiffs' claims is the death knell for
effective litigation. Indeed, in Delgado, "[n]ot unexpectedly, the actions
became mired in wrangling over procedural and evidentiary matters."'1 59
"Eventually, in 1998, the parties agreed to a settlement, but the plaintiffs
received only a fraction of what they could have reasonably anticipated to
receive had the trial taken place in the United States. ' 160 Arguably, such
a potential impact on the outcome of a foreign plaintiff's action goes to
the crux of whether the alternative forum is actually "'adequate' enough
152. Garro, supra note 27, at 85.
153. Id.
154. See id. at 87 n.53 (citing CODIGO PROCESAL CIVIL [COD. PROC. Civ.] arts. 125-31
(Costa Rica) as providing for the "acumulaci6n de procesos").
155. Id. at 88.
156. Id.
157. Dahl, supra note 77, at 41.
158. Anderson, supra note 84, at 184 (discussing Delgado, 890 F. Supp. at 1324).
159. Id.
160. Id. In particular, on average, Caribbean claimants recovered less than $2000 each
compared to U.S. victims who received awards in the hundreds of thousands of
dollars. Id. at 184 n.7.
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to provide plaintiffs with a meaningful remedy. '"161
c. Restrictions on Contingency Fees and Cost Advances and the
British Rule
Even further impeding the effective prosecution of mass tort claims in
Latin America is the cost factor. Initially, "[tlhe high costs and consider-
able efforts involved in litigating mass torts require that the aggregate of
the damages sought by thousands of individual plaintiffs makes their
counsels' efforts economically worthwhile.' 62 But in Latin America,
limitations and, in some cases, prohibitions on cost advancements and
contingency fee arrangements subtract substantially from any case's,
much less a mass tort case's, economic viability and, thus, the likelihood
of its prosecution. 163 In Venezuela, for example, "any agreement by
which the attorney acquires a personal interest in the outcome of the
case, including paying litigation expenses and calculating his or her fee as
a percentage of the award, is illegal. ' 164 Granted, "[s]ome trial attorneys
and clients frequently violate these rules and sign confidential agreements
with their clients stipulating that the fees will be based on contin-
gency."'1 65 But these agreements are not enforceable and, as one com-
mentator explains, "this poses an enormous risk to the lawyer, because
aside from jeopardizing his or her license to practice law, if a conflict
regarding fees arises between the client and the lawyer, a court will deem
the agreement invalid. ' 166 In the end, this risk "makes it difficult for cli-
ents to find lawyers willing to undertake their cases on a contingency ba-
sis in Venezuela. 1 67 Arguably, this risk also bears directly on whether a
foreign plaintiff's home country is really an adequate forum.
Also bearing on this determination is the risk that a losing plaintiff
would be charged with defendants' fees given that Latin American juris-
dictions adhere to the British Rule, where the losing party is automati-
cally charged with payment of the winning party's fees.168
161. Garro, supra note 27, at 65. Note that the question of whether an alternative fo-
rum affords a class action procedure might also be taken up among the private
interests factors to be weighed by a court in the forum non conveniens analysis. In
fact, considering the risk of atomization, it might be argued that there is a public
interest in keeping mass tort litigation claims in a single forum.
162. Id. at 88.
163. Note also that litigation in Latin America can be particularly cost-prohibitive inas-
much as many Latin American jurisdictions require the posting of "a bond (cau-
cion or arriago) in order to secure the eventual payment of court costs and
attorneys fees." Id. at 90 (citing CODIGO PROCEAL CIVIL [COD. PROC. Civ.] arts.
267-68 (Costa Rica); C6DIGo PROCEAL CIVIL [COD. PROC. Civ.] art. 33 (Braz.)).
164. Gomez, supra note 137, at 296 (citing CODIGO CIVIL [COD. Civ.] art. 1482
(Venez.); CODIGo ETICA DEL ABOGADO VENEZOLANO [COD. ETICA DEL ABO-
GADO VENEZOLANO] art. 39 (Venez.)).
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 297.
168. See id. (citing CODIGO PROCEAL CIVIL [COD. PROC. Civ.] art. 274 (Venez.);
CODIGO PROCEAL CIVIL [COE. PROC. Civ.] art. 389 (Colom.)).
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Professor Reynolds has argued that "attorney compensation should not
be a controlling factor in the adequate alternative forum inquiry" and
that "to make the case turn on that factor, given the uniqueness of the
American fee system, would eviscerate forum non conveniens. '' 169 In
fact, Professor Reynolds has contended that "by treating contingency fees
and jury awards as elements of a rather routine inquiry ostensibly focus-
ing on other factors, courts are able to avoid talking about some of the
real issues at hand," and "inquiry should always be directed at the real,
rather than the paper, factors. '170
With all due respect to Professor Reynolds, financial burdens to bring-
ing an action are arguably about as real as it gets. More often than not,
such burdens result in an actual impasse to bringing an action.
d. Deficient Working Facilities and Political Issues
The actual working facilities of many Latin American courts can unfor-
tunately be deplorable. In Ecuador, for example, one courthouse "is old
and run down.., up four flights of stairs, and is roughly half the size of a
tennis court. '171 In fact, in Jota v. Texaco, 172 dismissed to be tried in Ec-
uador, it was reported that "where the trial would take place in Ecuador,
does not have a courthouse;" the judge "works out of the third floor of a
cinderblock building on the edge of town;" and he "has one computer, no
fax machine, no Internet connection and no law clerks to assist with the
paperwork. '173
Added to the difficulty of operating under such conditions is the fact
that some Latin American judicial systems have become infused with a
certain level of corruption. It has been noted that Latin American judi-
cial systems "are vulnerable to the pressure exerted by the Executive
branch" in highly publicized cases. 174 In fact, some seem to suggest that
the corruption in Latin American judicial systems stems directly from the
substandard working conditions of the judiciary. Consider the following
summarization of the conditions that Latin American judges and others
must labor:
Judges, police chiefs, and other local officials in Latin America are
notoriously underpaid and provided with inadequate working facili-
169. Reynolds, supra note 21, at 1669.
170. Id.
171. Scott Wilson, Showdown in the Ecuadoran Jungle; Rare Class-Action Pollution
Trial Pits Indians Against U.S. Oil Company, WASH. POST, Oct. 23, 2003, at A18
(quoted by Nico, supra note 12, at 358-59).
172. Jota v. Texaco Inc., 157 F.3d 153 (2d Cir. 1998).
173. Marlowe, supra note 105, at 318 (quoting Eyal Press, Texaco on Trial, THE NA-
TION, May 31, 1999, at 13). Overall, deficiencies such as these in the Latin Ameri-
can judicial system have been described as chronic and are said to be compounded
by "anachronistic written and stiff proceedings subject to numerous appeals and
delays of all sorts." Garro, supra note 27, at 84. The Ecuadorian legal process has
been described as analogous to "something from 'early 1700s France."' Wilson,
supra note 171, at A18 (quoted by Nico, supra note 12, at 359).
174. Garro, supra note 27, at 84-85.
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ties; judges in smaller cities are usually isolated from each other for
months or years at a time-there are no annual conferences or con-
ventions; and finally, their tenure may well depend on maintaining
their local political contacts and friendships. 175
It certainly seems plausible that conditions like these are a natural pre-
cursor to corruption such that, even if "[t]he degree to which influence
peddling, bribery and corruption prevail in many [Latin American] coun-
tries varies," the predomination of a deficient judiciary remains constant
throughout. 176 In fact, "U.S. Department of State reports for [several
Latin American countries] regularly use the words 'corrupt,' 'subject to
influence,' and 'inefficient.' 1 77 Undoubtedly, an alternative forum inca-
pable of administering justice because of wholly deficient working facili-
ties and/or rampant impartiality is not an adequate forum. 178
e. Complex Service of Process
Service of process in Latin American legal systems is based on signifi-
cantly more formalistic procedural rules than that in the United States,
adding to the time and, ultimately, cost of prosecuting a claim there.179
175. Id. at 83 (quoting J.R. Thome, The Process of Land Reform in Latin America, 1968
Wis. L. REV. 9, 20-21 (1968).
176. Marlowe, supra note 105, at 310.
177. Id. at 310-11.
178. Even proponents of forum non conveniens, such as Professor Reynolds, concede
that "[w]hether the courts can function due to civil disorder ... should influence
resolution of whether there is an adequate forum." Reynolds, supra note 21, at
1670. And, some courts have given significant weight to identifiable corruption in
denying motions for forum non conveniens. In HSBC USA, Inc. v. Prosegur Para-
guay, S.A., for example, the court denied a motion to dismiss asserted by the de-
fendant, a Paraguayan armored car company. HSBC USA, Inc. v. Prosegur
Paraguay, S.A., No. 03 Civ. 3336(LAP), 2004 WL 2210283 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30,
2004). The plaintiff was a Maryland corporation that contracted with the defen-
dant for the transport of monies from banks in Paraguay to an airport there. Id. at
*1. The plaintiff brought the case when one of the defendant's vehicles transport-
ing the plaintiff's currency was robbed. Id. Because the case arises out of such
business dealings and because the plaintiff is a U.S. corporation, the case is not
really analogous to those coming within the scope of this paper. The case is nota-
ble, however, insofar as the court concluded that, "[i]n addition to the violence
that has already been directed at individual witnesses, HSBC would likely be una-
ble to obtain basic justice in Paraguay." Id. at *3. Granted, the defendant did
"little to rebut" the charges regarding Paraguay's ability to administer justice, but
the court did rely on more than mere "generalized allegations of corruption." Id.
In particular, the court noted that "a former high-level Paraguayan government
official was involved in planning the robbery;" "the robbery was undertaken to
fund the once-dominant political party in Paraguay;" and "[t]he robbery was alleg-
edly 'coordinated and supported by a network of current and ex-governmental,
military and police officials." Id. The court relied on a 2003 U.S. Department of
State Report, which said that "Paraguay was ranked the fourth most corrupt coun-
try in the world," as well as a 2000 U.S. State Department Report noting "that
denials of fair trials are common in Paraguay and the courts are often pressured by
politicians and other persons whose interests are at stake." Id. Finally, the court
noted that "[e]ven the former Attorney-General of Paraguay has remarked that
'there is a 'mafia' that controls the judiciary.'" Id.
179. See Dahl, supra note 77, at 40.
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In Mexico, for example, service of process "must follow strict procedu-
ral formalities," including initial service of process by an administrative
assistant of the court "who must describe in a certificate filed with the
court the precise circumstances under which the person was served."' 180
That certificate, in turn, becomes part of the court record. 181 Unlike the
United States, there are no provisions in Mexico for service of process by
mail.182
The real cost in adhering to such rigid procedural formalities183 is in
attempting to effect service of process on persons outside the Latin
American jurisdiction, including, for example, certain decision-makers in
a U.S.-based multinational corporation. As one commentator observed:
Latin American codes of civil procedure were enacted at a time
when international relations were a rarity. Accordingly, interna-
tional service of process is regulated in a very cumbersome way. In-
ternational service of process normally requires several layers of
Latin American bureaucracy: the Supreme Court of the issuing coun-
try, the Ministry of Foreign Relations, and that country's Consulate
to finally effect the actual service on the U.S. defendant. This proce-
dure can easily take one year. It can also be very expensive. Latin
American consulates have very large jurisdictions in the US. If a
defendant in a Costa Rican lawsuit had to be served in Hawaii, for
instance, the Costa Rican Consulate in Los Angeles would have to
perform service of process. The plaintiff would then have to pay for
the Consul's airfare to Hawaii and back, a hotel in Hawaii for two
days and the rental of a car for the same period. 184
f. Lack of Jurisdiction to Reach U.S. Assets
Finally, compounding the difficulty in obtaining redress in Latin Amer-
ican jurisdictions is that the jurisdiction of Latin American courts may not
extend to reach the assets of the U.S. corporate defendants even if a judg-
ment could be obtained in a Latin American court. 185 This would be par-
ticularly problematic in instances where the bulk of the corporations were
located, for example, in the United States, as might often be the case. As
one commentator said, "[a] US defendant who only has assets in the US
enjoys a privileged situation when the lawsuit is re-filed in Latin America,
pursuant to a [forum non conveniens] decision" inasmuch as "[s]uch de-
fendant can disregard a condemnatory Latin American judgment by chal-
180. STEPHEN ZAMORA ET AL, MEXICAN LAW 693 (2004) (citing CODIGO FEDERAL DE




184. Dahl, supra note 77, at 40 (citing CoDIGO PROCESAL CIVIL [COE. PROC. Civ.] art.
180 (Costa Rica); Convention on Private International Law, arts. 388-93, Feb. 20,
1928, 86 L.N.T.S. III, (Bustamante Code)). The Bustamante Code is also known
as the 1928 Pan American Code of Private International Law and is effectively a
treaty instrument to which many Latin American countries have subscribed.
185. See id. at 33.
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lenging its enforcement before a US court, where the assets are
located." 18 6
In sum, irrespective of whether they are categorized as failings in Latin
American legal systems or simply distinctions between those systems and
the U.S. system, the foregoing factors pose an almost insurmountable ob-
stacle to Latin American plaintiffs bringing their claims against U.S.-
based multinational corporations in Latin American courts. To the extent
one or more of the foregoing factors is evident in a given case, it might be
argued that any finding that an alternative Latin American forum is ade-
quate is a "rather fantastic fiction" indeed.187 In fact, determinations to
that effect under the forum non conveniens analysis demand the institu-
tion of changes in how that analysis is applied.
C. A SORT OF Hocus Pocus: UNCERTAINTY AND UNPREDICTABILITY
Sir Archy MacSarcasm said it in Love d la Mode: "The law is a sort of
hocus-pocus science, that smiles in yer face while it picks yer pocket: and
the glorious uncertainty of it is of more use to the professors than the
justice of it."188 His quip befits the U.S. courts' application of forum non
conveniens. Justice Black predicted the doctrine's unwieldy possibilities
in Gilbert, warning that
[t]he broad and indefinite discretion left to ... courts to decide the
question of convenience from the welter of factors which are rele-
vant to such a judgment, will inevitably produce a complex of close
and indistinguishable decisions from which accurate prediction .of the
proper forum will become difficult, if not impossible.189
True, in most cases brought by foreign plaintiffs, forum non conveniens
motions asserted by defendants are granted. Perhaps, in this regard, Jus-
tice Black was not correct in his prediction. The uncertainty and unpre-
dictability in precisely how courts will apply the forum non conveniens
inquiry, however, is patent. As even Professor Reynolds concedes, when
it comes to forum non conveniens, "the ability to predict the outcome of
cases may be illusory."'190
In many respects, it seems that the U.S. courts' application of forum
non conveniens is quite literally all over the place, a sort of hocus pocus
science, very nearly devoid of any consistency among the many elements
of adequacy, private interest, or public interest that are taken into consid-
eration and the weight given to any such considerations. Consider, for
example, Polanco v. H.B. Fuller Co.,19' where the court's determination
of the adequacy of the Guatemalan forum depended on the novel inquiry
186. Id. at 33-34.
187. Figueroa, supra note 52, at 45.
188. CHARLES MACKLIN, LOVE A LA MODE, act 2, sc. 1 (1759).
189. Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 516 (Black, J., dissenting).
190. Reynolds, supra note 21, at 1688.
191. Polanco v. H.B. Fuller Co., 941 F. Supp. 1512, 1525 (D. Minn. 1996) (a Guatemalan
citizen sued the U.S. parent company of a Guatemalan glue manufacturer after
plaintiff's brother died from inhaling glue).
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into the "nature of the lawsuit. '192
At least one critic of forum non conveniens suggests that the doctrine is
incoherent1 93 and, that is its greatest disservice, "creat[ing] a . . . lacuna
that frustrates the underlying tort law to which the U.S.-based
[multinational] has otherwise submitted itself.., creating dissonance be-
tween substantive and procedural rules. '194
Admittedly, it might be argued that U.S. multinationals have submitted
themselves to the foreign jurisdictions in plaintiffs' home countries, but as
explored in Part II(A) of this paper, that amounts to little more than U.S.
multinationals having found a liability-free zone.
As one commentator affirmed, "there is no need to tolerate the mis-
chief inherent in the double-barreled temptations created by discretion
without meaningful boundaries and opportunistic docket-clearing"' 195 by
the courts deciding forum non conveniens motions. In fact, there is no
need to tolerate the uncertainty and unpredictability of forum non con-
veniens analysis at all. Nor is there a need to tolerate the intellectual
chicanery that goes into demonstrating that alternative Latin American
forums are available and/or adequate. Nor is there a need to tolerate the
free pass that forum non conveniens affords U.S.-based multinational
corporations. This paper began with the premise that where there is a
will, there is a way. This Part has endeavored to show that there is, in-
deed, a cause for a cure, and attention will now turn to some proposed
remedial prescriptions.
III. SOME REMEDIAL PRESCRIPTIONS
As indicated at the start of this paper, remedial prescriptions for con-
tending with the problems inherent in the forum non conveniens analysis
will be categorized as (1) those that might be implemented in the United
States, (2) those that have been, and might be, implemented in Latin
American countries, and (3) those that might be implemented at the in-
ternational level.
A. RETHINKING FORUM NON CONVENIENS IN THE UNITED STATES
1. Coloring in the Lines: Reworking the Existing Framework
A thorough reworking of the application of the existing framework of
forum non conveniens must begin at the beginning, at the very outset
where a court positions itself to undertake the forum non conveniens
analysis. From a broad policy perspective, it has been contended that
"[clertain issues, especially those involving international wrongdoing, are
too important to be left to foreign courts" and that, therefore, U.S. courts
should not be reluctant to take up foreign plaintiffs' actions touching on
192. Marlowe, supra note 105, at 309 (citing Polanco, 941 F. Supp.).
193. Van Detta, supra note 2, at 59.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 82.
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such prominent matters. 196 The argument might be perceived as some-
what taboo, uninhibited as it is by issues of sovereignty. It is to the point,
though, and a more positive spin on it is that "U.S. courts must not shrink
from their leadership role in developing a body of law that extends be-
yond U.S. borders. ' 197 This is not a call for U.S. adjudication of all for-
eign plaintiffs' claims. Without question, stepping up to the plate for U.S.
courts cannot mean result-oriented decision making in favor of maintain-
ing jurisdiction over each and every foreign plaintiffs' tort action. But it
most certainly would mean a greater willingness to really chew on the
forum non conveniens analysis, evaluating the relevant balancing factors
with a heretofore unmatched sense of realism, perhaps including in that
analysis some of the perspectives discussed here.
In fact, recall that the forum non conveniens doctrine was introduced
in Gilbert as a mechanism for a court to "decline jurisdiction in excep-
tional circumstances." 198 And as discussed in Part I above, there is sound
basis to conclude that Piper did not deviate from that founding pre-
mise.1 99 In an increasingly globalized market, a market in which the larg-
est U.S. corporations are invariably multinational, injury to plaintiffs in
Latin America and other countries at the hand of those corporations is
hardly exceptional. Rather, cases arising out of those injuries will surface
in U.S. courts with increasing frequency. Even if there is a resistance to
retaining jurisdiction over these cases, for the reasons outlined in Part
II(A) of this paper as well as the U.S. public interest in these cases that
will be discussed in this Part, there must be a readiness in U.S. courts to
contend with them in a meaningful way.
Doing so might be accomplished by reconfiguring the disparate defer-
ence afforded a plaintiffs' choice of forum on the basis of citizenship and/
or residence; making real inquiry into the availability and adequacy of the
proposed alternative forum, taking into consideration those factors dis-
cussed at length in Part II(B)(2) of this paper; and both updating the
private and public interest components of the forum non conveniens
analysis as well as better tailoring-those components to address character-
istics particular to the alternative forum at issue.
a. Deference to Plaintiff's Choice of Forum
In determining the degree of deference owing to a plaintiff's choice of
forum in the forum non conveniens analysis, the distinction drawn be-
tween plaintiffs that are either U.S. citizens and residents and those that
are not is arguably not in keeping with the very policies that the presump-
tion in favor of a plaintiff's choice of forum emanated. Indeed, as much
as forum non conveniens jurisprudence is in need of some coherency, the
196. Paul B. Stephan, A Becoming Modesty - U.S. Litigation in the Mirror of Interna-
tional Law, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 627, 635 (2002).
197. Id.
198. Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 504.
199. See Nico, supra note 12, at 350 (discussing Piper Aircraft Co., 454 U.S.).
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distinction interjects rigidity at the wrong point in the analysis.200 Recall
that even the Wiwa court rejected attaching "'a talismanic significance to
the citizenship or residence of the parties"201 as form over substance.
Furthermore, as discussed in Part I above, the policy underlying a pre-
sumption in favor of a plaintiff's choice of forum appears to be a genuine
interest in respecting a plaintiff's choice. As the court in Cromer noted,
even if the plaintiff is foreign, some weight must be given to the foreign
plaintiff's forum choice.202 And, as the court in Wiwa observed, that
weight might be determined by focusing on the plaintiff's ties to the fo-
rum; "the greater the plaintiff's ties to the plaintiff's chosen forum, the
more likely it is that the plaintiff would be inconvenienced by a require-
ment to bring the claim in a foreign jurisdiction. '20 3
Gradations of deference afforded to plaintiff's choice of forum depend-
ing on the facts at hand and within the confines of specified predictors
might not only be more just, but more in keeping with the original poli-
cies underlying the presumption in favor of a plaintiff's choice of forum.
Such gradations are not necessarily a novel concept. For example, analy-
sis of claims under the Alien Tort Claims Act have been argued to
suggest an evolution of foreign plaintiff distinction into four levels of
deference: 1) U.S. citizens (most deference); 2) non-citizen U.S. re-
sidents (much deference); 3) foreign plaintiffs for whom the home
forum is not an option (some deference); and 4) foreign plaintiffs
who could potentially litigate in their home forum (least
deference). 204
These gradations take into consideration both the plaintiff's ties to the
plaintiff's chosen forum as well as the actual degree of inconvenience as-
sociated with the foreign jurisdiction-a marriage in line with Wiwa.
In considering these gradations of deference, it has been further sug-
gested that "[c]ourts should adhere to the gradations of deference" and
treat them "as an approximation of inconvenience," though not a rigid
rule. 20 5 By doing so, it is argued, "courts could retain flexibility while
adding consistency to the doctrine of forum non conveniens. '20 6
b. Availability and Adequacy
Consider the following reflection on the review of the district court's
determination of adequacy and availability of the alternative Ecuadorian
200. In fact, at best it goes to the resource conservation and protectionist arguments
asserted by Professors Weintraub and Reynolds. See International Litigation and
Forum Non Conveniens, supra note 63, at 352 (quoted in Reed, supra note 61, at
63); Reynolds, supra note 21, at 1693, 1694.
201. Wiwa, 226 F.3d at 102 (quoting Alcoa S.S. Co., 654 F. Supp. at 154).
202. Cromer, 158 F. Supp. at 354.
203. Wiwa, 226 F.3d at 102.
204. John F. Carella, Comment, Of Foreign Plaintiffs and Proper Fora: Forum Non
Conveniens and ATCA Class Actions, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 717, 735 (2003).
205. Id.
206. Id.
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forum made by the U.S. Court of Appeal for the Second Circuit in
Aguinda:2 0 7
In considering whether Ecuador was an adequate alternative forum,
the Court found no abuse in discretion by the District Court in its
findings that Law 55/98 would not preclude a suit in Ecuador after
having first been initiated in the U.S. as the Law had been declared
unconstitutional by the Ecuadorian Constitutional Court on April
30, 2002. The Court further found no merit to plaintiff's claims that
Ecuadorian courts were unreceptive to tort claims and with regard to
the absence of class action mechanisms stating "while the need for
thousands of individual plaintiffs to authorize the action in their
names is more burdensome than having them represented by a rep-
resentative in a class action, it is not so burdensome as to deprive the
plaintiffs of an effective alternative forum." As to the arguments of
Ecuadorian courts' corrupt influence and ability to be impartial, the
court cited the District Court's finding and noted that "because these
cases will be the subject of close public and political scrutiny, as con-
firmed by the Republic's involvement in the litigation, there is little
chance of undue influence being applied. '20 8
The hurdles identified by the Ecuadorian plaintiff are in line with many
of those outlined in Part II(B)(2) above and strike one as insurmounta-
ble. Yet, as noted, "[t]he Court ... found no merit to plaintiff's claims" as
to the unavailability or inadequacy of the Ecuadorian court.20 9 In fact,
the court did not even address "considerations raised by plaintiffs regard-
ing the financial burden of filing fees in Ecuador and travel advisories
issued for the province in which the Ecuadorian trial would be held. '2 10
The analysis in Aquinda evidences a malfunctioning forum non con-
veniens framework. In fact, it evidences the possibility that something is
lost in translation.As to the availability of the alternative forum, Aguinda
made reference to Ecuadorian Law Number 55, a blocking statute intro-
duced by Ecuador in response to U.S. courts' application of forum non
conveniens, the likes of which will be discussed in more detail in Part
III(B)(1). 21 1 For now, it is apparent that what is missing in the Aguinda
analysis, and in the forum non conveniens analysis as a whole, is an actual
understanding of the embedded jurisdictional bars to foreign plaintiffs'
refiling of their cases in Latin America.
Recall, as discussed in Part II(B)(1) above, that Latin American coun-
tries' understanding of jurisdiction might operate as a bar to plaintiffs
refiling their cases in their home countries once those cases have been
207. Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 303 F.3d 470 (2d Cir. 2002).
208. Lyons, supra note 92, at 715-16 (citing and quoting the Second Circuit's review of
Aguinda, 303 F.3d at 478).
209. Id. at 715 (discussing the Second Circuit's review of Aguinda, 303 F.3d at 479).
210. Id. at 716.
211. See Ley Interpretativa de Los Artfculos 27, 28, 29, y 30 del C6digo de
Procedimiento Civil para los Casos de Competencia Concurrente Internacional
[Law Interpreting Articles 27, 28, 29, and 30 of the Code of Civil Procedure Pro-
viding for Concurrent International Jurisdiction], Law No. 55 (Jan. 27, 1998) (Ec-
uador) (translated in Dahl, supra note 77, at 48).
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dismissed by U.S. courts and that transfer of these cases to the alternative
Latin American forum may not be permissible under Latin American ju-
risdictional rules. It has been noted that such was the case in Ecuador
and that, importantly, Ecuadorian Law Number 55 only clarified that
fact.2 12 That is, Ecuadorian Law Number 55 did not change the law in
Ecuador.2 13 As such, ending with inquiry into Ecuadorian Law Number
55, Aguinda's inquiry on availability of the Ecuadorian forum stopped
short.
On this score, it has been suggested that, in order to legitimately apply
the forum non conveniens doctrine, courts must actually "focus on under-
standing the predicates of jurisdiction in a civil law country. '2 14 Not un-
like Aguinda, "U.S. courts have failed to engage in a thorough
examination of jurisdictional rules of the foreign fora, which in tort ac-
tions is likely not to be 'available' once the plaintiffs choose to sue before
the courts of the defendant's domicile. '2 15 Engaging in that examination
alone might serve to salvage innumerable cases from the wreckage of fo-
rum non conveniens dismissal. If it is clear that the foreign jurisdiction
will not exercise jurisdiction over the matter once it is dismissed from the
U.S. court, the availability prong of the forum non conveniens analysis is
answered outright in the negative.
Some courts already appear to be getting the message. As noted
above, conditional dismissals are not in and of themselves a solution to
the forum non conveniens dilemma. But dismissals conditioned on the
foreign court retaining jurisdiction demonstrate at least a recent aware-
ness on behalf of U.S. courts that there might be a jurisdictional impedi-
ment to foreign plaintiffs refiling their claims in their home countries.
Consider USHA (India), Ltd. v. Honeywell International, Inc., for ex-
ample, wherein the court's dismissal was only suspensive, such that plain-
tiffs would be free to reinstate their action in the U.S. court "depending
on the course of litigation, if any, in the New Delhi High Court. '2 16 In
light of the many other impediments to plaintiffs actually pursuing their
claims in their home countries as discussed in Part II(B)(2) above, it is
questionable whether such a condition would even be tested. Putting
aside for the moment the impediments to plaintiffs actually refiling their
claims in India, however, the decision in Honeywell does at least appear
to afford room for reinstatement of plaintiffs' claims in the U.S. court if
jurisdictional or procedural rules in India preclude refiling there. Though
a more constructive step would have been actual inquiry in some way into
whether the Indian court would exercise jurisdiction over the case, deci-
sions like the Honeywell decision are a first step, if nothing else.
212. See Dahl, supra note 77, at 43.
213. See id.
214. Garro, supra note 27, at 66.
215. Id.
216. USHA (India) Ltd., 421 F.3d. at 136.
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With regard to the adequacy prong of the forum non conveniens analy-
sis, arriving at an understanding as to whether a foreign forum will actu-
ally afford the required meaningful remedy 217 requires a much closer
look at the alternative forum than that afforded in Aguinda and in the
current forum non conveniens analysis at large. As one commentator put
it, the adequacy inquiry requires "an informed decision as to whether the
'alternative' forum may provide, not only in law but also in fact, a fair
trial within a reasonable period of time leading, in cases where defend-
ants are found liable, to meaningful redress." 218 In that vein, "the test of
'adequacy' must rely not only on formal rules of law, but must also take
into account the day-to-day practice of the administration of justice in the
transferee court, as opposed to superficial consideration of the law on the
books." 2 19 In other words, "[c]ourts must look beyond the prima facie
existence of an adequate alternative legal forum in deciding whether to
dismiss cases filed in the United States. '220 As has been pointed out,
[o]n paper, a country might have a tripartite governmental system,
similar to that of the United States, as well as a judiciary filled with
life appointed judges[, but] one cannot glean the existence of verita-
ble due process solely from a reading of the Constitution and statutes
of the suggested alternative forum.221
Rather, courts must look, at least, to the many factors discussed in Part
II(B)(2) above.222
The determination in Martinez v. Dow Chemical Co.,2 2 3 another of the
DBCP actions, as to the adequacy of the alternative Honduran forum,
exemplifies the kind of in-depth inquiry needed, taking into consideration
many of those factors outlined in Part II(B)(2). In Martinez, the court
determined that Honduras was not an adequate forum, pointing to "fun-
damental defects that indicate a high likelihood that plaintiffs will be
treated unfairly" in the Honduran judicial system.224 Conceding that
"the [Honduran] Constitution provides for an independent judiciary," the
court relied on a 2002 U.S. Department of State Report indicating that
"the judiciary is poorly staffed and equipped, often ineffective, and sub-
217. Garro, supra note 27, at 66.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Marlowe, supra note 105, at 304.
221. Id.
222. In fact, given the mass tort nature of the kind of cases at issue in this paper, one
commentator expressly proposed that inquiry into the adequacy of an alternative
forum include investigation into "the availability of the class action device" in that
forum. Carella, supra note 204, at 736. As noted above, the question of whether
an alternative forum affords a class action procedure might also be taken up
among the private interest factors to be weighted by a court in the forum non
conveniens analysis. And again, considering the risk of atomization of the cases at
issue in this paper once those cases are dismissed from the U.S. court, it might be
argued that there is a public interest in keeping mass tort litigation claims in a
single forum.
223. Martinez, 219 F. Supp. at 719.
224. Id. at 738. Note as discussed in Part I above that the court found Costa Rican
courts to be an adequate forum.
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ject to outside influence" and that "[w]hile the Government respects con-
stitutional provisions in principle, implementation has been weak and
uneven in practice. '2 25 Specifically, the court noted the following factors
identified by the Department of State:
[B]oth the judiciary and the Public Ministry suffer from inadequate
funding; low wages and lack of internal controls make law enforce-
ment officials susceptible to bribery; the civil law inquisitorial system
is both inefficient and opaque; and powerful special interests still ex-
ercise influence and often prevail in the courts .... [A]pproximately
35 percent of the complaints received by the National Human Rights
Commission concern the judicial system.226
In sum, the Martinez court's inquiry into whether Honduras was an
adequate forum was a relatively thorough one.
In addition to the procedural aspects of whether and how a plaintiff
might bring a case exemplified in Martinez, inquiry into the adequacy of
an alternative forum might also include investigation into what substan-
tive relief would be available to that plaintiff in the alternative forum. It
is important to note that such an inquiry would not necessarily be a devia-
tion from the understanding of a meaningful remedy currently set out in
the jurisprudence. Recall, the standard has been expressed as whether
"[a] foreign forum is adequate when the parties will not be deprived of all
remedies or treated unfairly even though they may not enjoy the same
benefits as they might receive in an American court. '227 There seems
ample room in that standard between whether a forum would completely
deprive a plaintiff of all remedies and the fact that plaintiffs merely "may
not enjoy the same benefits as they might receive in an American
court. 228 And there are substantial differences in the actual relief availa-
ble under the substantive law of the United States and the substantive
law of Latin American forums. Arguably, "the 'adequacy' analysis calls
for further examination of the type of remedy that can be actually ob-
tained" in the alternative forum.229 Arguably, given that defendants are,
in fact, U.S.-based multinational corporations subject to U.S. jurisdiction,
such a line of questioning is central to a defensible adequacy analysis.
c. Private Interest Factors
The current understanding of the private and public interest factors to
be evaluated in the forum non conveniens analysis is arguably not only
outmoded but considerably misguided and, as such, warrants revision.
Again, consider the determination made on review of the district
court's determination in Aguinda, where "[t]he court also found no abuse
225. Id. at 737 (quoting U.S. DEPT. STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS. ON HUMAN RIGHTS
PRACTICES, HONDURAS (Mar. 4, 2002)).
226. Id. (quoting COUNTRY REPORTS. ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES, HONDURAS,
supra note 225).
227. Delgado, 890 F. Supp. at 1356.
228. Id.
229. Garro, supra note 27, at 95.
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of discretion in the District Court's conclusion that private interests
'weigh[ed] heavily' in favor of an Ecuadorian forum. '2 30 In particular,
consider the following reflection on the court's conclusions:
The Court stated: The relative ease of access to sources of proof fa-
vors proceeding in Ecuador. All plaintiffs, as well as members of
their putative classes, live in Ecuador or Peru. Plaintiffs sustained
their injuries in Ecuador and Peru, and their relevant medical and
property records are located there. Also located in Ecuador are the
records of decisions taken by the Consortium, along with evidence of
Texaco's defenses implicating the roles of PetroEcuador and the Re-
public. By contrast, plaintiffs have failed to establish that the parent
Texaco made decisions regarding oil operations in Ecuador or that
evidence of any such decisions is located in the U.S. Furthermore,
the court noted that it would be onerous for a New York court to
handle translation issues and that "to the extent that evidence exists
within the U.S., plaintiffs' concerns are partially addressed by Tex-
aco's stipulation to allow use of the discovery already obtained."
Likewise, the Court found that the district court was within its dis-
cretion in concluding that the public interest factors tilt in favor of
dismissal. The Court did not address... plaintiffs' plea to interpret
the ATCA "to encompass their environmental claim" and "to ex-
press . . .a strong U.S. policy interest in providing a forum for the
adjudication of such claims. '231
Even a cursory review suggests the court missed the mark on several
fronts. Initially, and as to "Texaco's stipulation to allow use of the discov-
ery already obtained," it is notable that Aguinda undertook no inquiry
into whether the Ecuadorian jurisdiction would even allow into evidence
all that "discovery already obtained. '23 2  As discussed in Part
II(B)(2)(A), there are significant differences in Latin American and U.S.
understandings of how discovery is conducted and to what end. Inquiry
into such differences should have been undertaken in Aguinda before re-
lying on Texaco's stipulation as an alleviating factor.
In fact, one commentator has suggested that, in light of the particular
brand of evidentiary difficulties discussed at length in Part II(B)(2)(A) of
this paper, the private interest leg of forum non conveniens should in-
clude an inquiry into whether "transferring the case to the foreign coun-
try would result in a gain, not in a loss, of evidence. '233 Such an inquiry
might, indeed, serve to tip the scales in favor of real fairness in more
cases than not.
Finally, seemingly lost on the Aguinda court is that trial attorneys to-
day are well-versed in the technological advancements that have eased
some of the strain in conducting discovery in other jurisdictions and even
230. Lyons, supra note 92, at 716 (citing the Second Circuit's review of Aguinda, 303
F.3d at 479).
231. Id. at 716-17 (citing and quoting the Second Circuit's review of Aguinda, 303 F.3d
at 479-80).
232. Id. at 716.
233. Dahl, supra note 77, at 43.
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in presenting evidence at trial. Indeed, there are now evident improve-
ments on the improvements. Depositions, for example, once conducted
only in person, then conducted by telephone conference, can now be con-
ducted by closed-circuit television or live webcast. It is the tiniest mental
leap to conclude that, in light of these and innumerable other technologi-
cal advances, the weight courts like that in Aguinda give to the physical
location of evidence and witnesses in undertaking the forum non con-
veniens analysis may simply no longer be appropriate. 234
d. Public Interest Factors
Looking finally to the public interest leg of the forum non conveniens
analysis, there are arguably several means of reformulating the current
thinking in order to better address the particular circumstances arising in
the kinds of cases at issue in this paper.
Common among many proponents of the current forum non con-
veniens analysis is a guttural reaction against the expenditure of U.S. ju-
dicial resources and the resulting increased costs that might be borne by
U.S. taxpayers should U.S. courts retain jurisdiction over foreign plain-
tiffs' cases. That is, there is arguably a public interest in favor of conser-
vation of U.S. judicial resources. Recall, for example, Professor
Weintraub's stated desire to avoid U.S. courts "becom[ing] a 'magnet fo-
rum for the afflicted of the world"' 235 and Professor Reynolds' insistence
"that scarce judicial resources ... should not be wasted on foreigners. '23 6
In addition to these, one commentator observes that "U.S. Courts have
underscored the effects of foreign litigation on U.S. taxpayers who bear
the costs involved in litigation brought by a foreign plaintiff in the United
States" and that those courts "have been eager to halt such a deviation
from resources and potential docket congestion. '237
On the one hand, Justice Doggett opined in Alfaro with regard to the
citizens of Texas that "[o]ur citizenry recognizes that a wrong does not
fade away because its immediate consequences are first felt far away
rather than close to home. ' 238 Though it would certainly be an overstate-
ment to extend the sentiment articulated by Justice Doggett to the collec-
tive citizenry of the United States, there are certainly those among the
U.S. citizenry who would agree "that a wrong does not fade away because
its immediate consequences are first felt far away rather than close to
home. '239 Those citizens might be inclined to incur the additional costs
and even taxes attendant to redressing that wrong. On the other hand,
there remains in some circles the very entrenched resistance to retaining
234. See Santoyo, supra note 15, at 716-17 (citing Martin Davies, Time to Change the
Federal Forum Non Conveniens Analysis, 77 TUL. L. REv. 309, 324-51 (2002)).
235. International Litigation and Forum Non Conveniens, supra note 63, at 352 (quoted
in Reed, supra note 61, at 63).
236. Reynolds, supra note 21, at 1694.
237. Figueroa, supra note 52, at 43.
238. Martinez, 219 F. Supp. at 680.
239. Id.
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jurisdiction over the cases of non-U.S. citizens, and if only an undercur-
rent, that resistance serves as a significant obstacle to retaining jurisdic-
tion over these cases.
One pragmatic observation is that the issue of the added costs and
taxes attendant to trying foreign plaintiffs' claims against U.S.-based mul-
tinational corporations "is a false dilemma. '240 These are not cases with
no connection to the U.S. jurisdiction in which they are brought. As ex-
plained, the cases at issue are "eligible for being tried in the U.S .... only
if subject matter and personal jurisdiction requirements were satis-
fied."' 241 Note that "U.S. jurisdictional rules state that once a corporation
or entity incorporates in one jurisdiction, the requisite of minimum con-
tacts is satisfied. '2 42 The cases at issue are cases against U.S. multination-
als brought in those corporations' home jurisdictions, such that these
corporations do have at least "minimum contacts to the U.S. 243
Professor Reynolds underscores in his arguments in favor of the cur-
rent application of forum non conveniens that "[t]he reality of modern
economic life is that multinationals have multiple 'homes."' 244 And he is
right. But with regard to multinationals headquartered and/or incorpo-
rated in the United States, it might be argued that the reality is that those
corporations and the remaining U.S. citizenry should expect suits to be
brought against those corporations in the U.S. jurisdiction where they are
headquartered or incorporated, particularly given that premise has long
been rooted in U.S. jurisdictional law.
In fact, it might even be argued that "[l]ocal taxpayers are not de-
frauded by judicial resource expenditures covering cases with substantial
ties to foreign countries[, but] [r]ather, it is precisely because 'taxpay-
ers ... pay for the operation of its judiciary' that [those taxpayers] ...
should be concerned. ' 245 That is, it is precisely because taxpayers pay for
the operation of the U.S. judiciary that those taxpayers should endeavor
to ensure that the judiciary is adjudicating actions properly brought
before it.
Another angle is that U.S. taxpayers, including U.S.-based multina-
tional corporations named in these foreign plaintiffs' actions, are account-
able for the profits garnered by those U.S.-based multinationals operating
in the foreign plaintiffs' home countries. As such, U.S. courts should be
available for redress of the wrongs committed during the course of those
operations irrespective of the added costs.
240. Figueroa, supra note 52, at 43.
241. Id.
242. Id. at 44.
243. Id. at 43. In fact, as discussed at more length below, in many of the cases where
forum non conveniens is applied to dismiss foreign plaintiffs' product liability ac-
tions, the products at issue were "designed or fabricated in the U.S. by an Ameri-
can corporation," thus establishing even further contacts with the U.S. jurisdiction.
Gomez, supra note 137, at 283.
244. Reynolds, supra note 21, at 1695.
245. Marlowe, supra note 105, at 309 (quoting Kinney Sys., Inc. v. Cont'l Ins. Co., 674
So.2d 86, 93 (Fla. 1996)).
2007]
50 LAW AND BUSINESS REVIEW OF THE AMERICAS [Vol. 13
All these policy arguments aside, one reasonable means of alleviating
discomfort as to the added costs and taxes attendant to trying foreign
plaintiffs' claims against U.S.-based multinational corporations in U.S.
courts is to allow U.S. courts to assess these added costs and deduct these
costs from the monetary awards paid to Latin American plaintiffs.2 46 As
such, Latin American plaintiffs effectively pay into a system that has
served their needs in much the same way U.S. taxpayers already have.
Looking at the public interest inquiry from a more bird's-eye view, one
commentator proposes a broad-based revision to that inquiry,
"[f]actoring moral and social responsibility into the forum non con-
veniens balance. '2 47 That commentator emphasizes that, as it stands
now, "public factors include a limited consideration of moral and social
values - those concerning rights and responsibilities of the local commu-
nity."24 8 But as she continues, "communities today are often global
rather than local."'249 "Disputes are taking on international parameters
as economic and social spheres have expanded," such that purely local
public interest factors "fail to accommodate these changes. '25 0
Perhaps that commentator is on to something. Indeed, it might be ar-
gued that a global public interest in human rights is emerging and that
"[t]he ability to bring a claim and to be heard by a court of law in a fair
and impartial manner, should be part of the basic human rights available
to all individuals regardless of nationality."'2 5'
Granted, however valid that premise, the question arises as to why U.S.
courts should be the ones to accommodate that right. As Professor Reyn-
olds observes, free access to the U.S. judicial system, in particular, might
be no more than a myth, as "American courts sitting in equity have al-
ways exercised a discretionary power to decline jurisdiction, and our fed-
eral courts have long had the authority to abstain from deciding cases
over which they had jurisdiction. '252
Initially, it might be argued that "[r]esponsibility to ensure the spread
of international human rights rests on the shoulders of countries benefit-
ing from globalization. '25 3 As noted above, the United States benefits
from the profits incurred by U.S.-based multinationals operating in for-
eign plaintiffs' home countries. The United States benefits from global-
ization. As such, it is arguable that the United States does have a
responsibility and a public interest to ensure the respect for international
human rights in that process. Fodder for this position, and indicative of
an emerging global public interest in human rights, is the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia's assertion that "[b]orders
246. See Dahl, supra note 77, at 46.
247. Nico, supra note 12, at 347.
248. Id. at 349.
249. Id. at 348.
250. Id. at 349.
251. Id. at 357.
252. Reynolds, supra note 21, at 1710.
253. Nico, supra note 12, at 360.
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should not be considered as a shield against the reach of the law and as a
protection for those who trample underfoot the most elementary rights of
humanity. 254
It might also be argued that there is U.S. public interest in ensuring
"the responsibility of American companies to their employees in foreign
countries in which they manufacture goods. '2 55 It can hardly be ques-
tioned that the Untied States is an avid consumer of those goods. One
commentator noted that, "[In 2002], 96% of the apparel purchased in the
U.S. was made in other countries. '256 At least in those tort actions aris-
ing out of working conditions, an interest in resolution of these cases in
U.S. courts might be located, quite simply, in the fact that the United
States is consuming the products produced under those conditions.
Even if a sense of responsibility to the workforce abroad is not enough,
however, there are economic welfare consequences for the United States.
These consequences arguably stem directly from allowing U.S.-based
multinational corporations to operate in other countries without being
held accountable in U.S. courts for injurious conduct. Staving off these
consequences is arguably in the U.S. public interest and might be factored
into the forum non conveniens analysis.
In particular, as discussed in Part II(A), the current forum non con-
veniens analysis fuels the global race to the bottom. At least one eco-
nomic welfare consequence is an increasing drain on U.S. labor. As it
stands, "corporations have a great incentive to move jobs from the
United States to developing countries to take advantage of relaxed (or
non-existent) labor and environmental laws, allowing corporations to es-
cape liability for their actions. '2 57 And, as the statistics go, "[s]ince 2000,
nearly 2.6 million U.S. jobs have been lost."'2 58 In fact, it has been calcu-
lated that, "from 1996 to 2000, outsourcing by U.S. firms tripled from $
100 billion to $ 345 billion a year, '259 and some have estimated that "1 in
4 factory jobs have disappeared. '260 There is arguably a U.S. public in-
terest in holding U.S.-based multinational corporations accountable in or-
der to slow down this drain on U.S. labor. As one commentator
surmised, "Americans will benefit from more open courts, because com-
panies will have a reduced incentive to export American jobs. 261
It might also be argued that the United States has a consumer protec-
tion interest that might be taken into consideration in the forum non con-
veniens analysis. Specifically, the United States has a strong regulatory
254. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, Decision, 35 I.L.M. 32, 52 (1996).
255. Nico, supra note 12, at 347.
256. Id. at 362 n.3 (quoting Leslie Earnest, Levi, An American Icon, To Shut Last Plants
in U.S., L.A. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2003, at Al).
257. Id. at 359.
258. Id. at 355.
259. Id. at 362 n.3 (citing Evelyn Iritani, High-Paid Jobs Latest U.S. Export, L.A. TIMES,
Apr. 2, 2002, at Al).
260. Id. at 362 n.84 (citing Warren Vieth, As Factory Job Losses Rise, So Do Risks to
Bush, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 25, 2003, at Al).
261. Id. at 359.
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interest in product liability cases brought by foreign plaintiffs against
U.S.-based multinational corporations insofar as "[c]orrective justice is
best achieved here through judicial regulation of the principal players in
the country where the tort (in design and/or manufacture) likely occurred
- here, in the United States. '262 In many instances, the bad action to
which the United States arguably has an interest in applying its corrective
justice takes place entirely in the United States. In the dissenting opinion
in De Melo v. Lederle,263 Judge Swygert wrote:
I cannot help observing that Lederle is a multinational corporation.
It has chosen to do business in Brazil. When such companies do bus-
iness in foreign countries they should not, by that fact, manage to
evade the force of American law. De Melo ingested the drug in Bra-
zil. But the decision to warn of only temporary blindness occurred in
the United States, and was made by United States citizens in the
employ of a United States corporation. These facts suggest that the
United States is the most appropriate forum to hear Ms. de Melo's
complaint.2 64
Such arguments as to the locus of the bad action are not novel in forum
non conveniens cases, but a regulatory interest in applying corrective jus-
tice to that action might warrant giving those arguments more serious
weight.26 5
Indeed, from a consumer protection perspective, the ramifications of
not locating a U.S. public interest in adjudicating foreign plaintiffs' claims
against U.S.-based multinationals could be far reaching, extending even
to the U.S. consumer. In products liability, for example, there has been
coined the term "Circle of Poison;" that term refers to "a pattern of com-
merce where dangerous pesticides-not legal for use in the United States
or restricted only to certain specific uses-are manufactured by U.S.
chemical corporations and sold abroad. ' 266 Upon receipt abroad,
"[t]hese chemicals then are used on food crops for export to the United
262. Van Detta, supra note 2, at 78.
263. De Melo v. Lederle Labs, 801 F.2d 1058 (8th Cir. 1986).
264. Id. at 1065 (quoted in Rogge, supra note 80, at 313).
265. In fact, weighing the costs and benefits between trying a matter in a foreign plain-
tiff's home country, where the injury occurred, and trying a matter in the United
States where the bad act might have happened, the latter arguably wins out. In a
negligence action, there must be proof of duty, breach, causation, and injury. The
fact of a plaintiff's injury is, more often than not, the least demanding matter of
proof. It is the question of whether defendants owed plaintiff a duty, whether that
duty was breached, and whether that breach caused plaintiff's injuries that gener-
ally prove to be the more complex inquiries. And in the case of multinationals
headquartered in the United States, it seems plausible that, more often than not,
the bad act amounting to the breach and injuries took place in the United States,
such that the necessary proof of that breach would be located in the United States.
The interest in prosecuting the case in a U.S. court, where that proof would be
more accessible, might be characterized as a public interest in regulation of that
bad action or as a private interest factor relating to the availability of proof.
266. Paul Correa, Tort and the U.S.-Mexican Circle of Poison, 12 ARIZ. J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 653, 653 (1995).
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States. '267 It has been noted that, invariably, "[c]ases have been brought
against U.S. pesticide manufacturers ... but the industry is shielded from
liability by a variety of legal defenses," including, not surprisingly, forum
non conveniens. 268 Simply put, U.S. public interest may be found in
bringing to task U.S.-based multinational corporations in U.S. courts, as
those corporations' operations might endanger not only foreign plaintiffs
but also U.S. consumers.
In sum, there are a handful of ways that the current understanding of
the forum non conveniens analysis might be adjusted such that a determi-
nation under the doctrine might not necessarily be any less uncertain but
might be significantly more justifiable. Perhaps that would be enough. In
endeavoring to gage the potential success of any remedial prescription,
consideration must always be given to the ease with which it might be
incorporated into the jurisprudence and applied in future cases. Propos-
als that purport to reshape an existing framework are likely to be the
most palatable.
2. Thinking Outside the Box: Introducing a New Framework
Other suggestions for contending with the myriad difficulties in apply-
ing forum non conveniens and its undesirable consequences within the
United States are more drastic. There is, for example, at least one propo-
nent of legislation that would overrule forum non conveniens entirely.269
Given the wide divergence in policy considerations proffered by those in
favor of curtailment of forum non conveniens and the policy considera-
tions proffered by those in favor of the doctrine's current application, it
seems unlikely that any such legislation is a real possibility. Further, as a
note of caution, debate on the matter is so polarized, care would need to
be given that the end-product of any legislative negotiations not be
marred by an emasculating compromise.
That being said, codification of the forum non conveniens doctrine
does have its merits, and some have proposed legislative efforts along
such lines. For example, one proposal would limit forum non conveniens
dismissals to those cases where "the defendant shows that 'the chosen
forum is unnecessarily or unreasonably inconvenient and that the alter-
nate forum is more convenient."' 270 Such a limitation would raise de-
fendants' burden of proof on a motion to dismiss for forum non
conveniens. It would also bring the application of forum non conveniens
to foreign plaintiffs' actions back in line with the original policies underly-
ing introduction of the doctrine in Gilbert. Recall that the Gilbert court's
interest was in addressing the fact that "[a] plaintiff sometimes is under
temptation to resort to a strategy of forcing the trial at a most inconve-
267. Id.
268. Id. at 668.
269. See Van Detta, supra note 2, at 53.
270. Figueroa, supra note 52, at 46 (quoting Kearse, supra note 2, at 1325).
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nient place for an adversary, even at some inconvenience to himself."
27 1
The proposal incorporates several components that do more to ensure
that it is those cases that the Gilbert court expressed concern that would
result in dismissal under a forum non conveniens analysis.
First, the proposal shifts the inquiry away from whether a plaintiff's
home country is a more convenient forum and replaces that inquiry with
whether plaintiff's chosen forum is inconvenient. Such a shift is suited to
these cases where U.S.-based multinational corporations are being sued
in their home forums and, perhaps, even in the forum where the alleged
bad action took place. 272 The matter is connected to such a forum, and
the proposal would require demonstrating that the connection is overrid-
den by genuine inconvenience.
This brings up the second component: the proposal requires a showing
that the chosen forum is unnecessarily or unreasonably inconvenient.
Such a showing would be precisely in line with the policy stated in Gil-
bert. It would revive the watered-down presumption in favor of a plain-
tiff's choice of forum while unearthing any strategy to force the trial at a
most inconvenient place for an adversary, even at some inconvenience to
the plaintiff. On the whole, the proposal would seem to do a great deal to
correct the current overextended application of forum non conveniens.
Critics have contended, however, that such a proposal fails to suffi-
ciently address the lack of consistent application of the forum non con-
veniens doctrine. 273 Rather, according to those critics, such proposed
legislation does little more than attempt to heighten defendant's burden,
leaving judicial discretion, and varied application of that burden, wholly
intact.2 74 But it would be disingenuous to insist that there would be no
value in raising the bar in this way.
Other suggestions meriting note are "[d]enying the possibility of a [fo-
rum non conveniens] dismissal if the U.S. defendant is sued in a venue
where it is headquartered or incorporated" or "[a]ccepting jurisdiction
over cases dealing with matters that are relevant for U.S. policies in the
context of foreign trade and product injury. '2 75 Very different proposals,
the former would serve to recognize defendants' connection with the cho-
sen forum in cases brought against them in their home jurisdiction, but it
might very well, even if only in a few cases, introduce entirely too much
rigidity. In those instances, for example, when it can truly be shown that
an alternative forum is available and adequate and that private and public
interest factors truly weigh in favor of the alterative forum (all in keeping
271. Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 507.
272. See Figueroa, supra note 52, at 46 ("The idea behind these proposed legislative
amendments is to make U.S. multinational corporations amenable to their domes-
tic fora, where they are incorporated, and where they 'developed, manufactured,
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with the proposed adjustments to those inquiries here), fairness might
very well dictate dismissal of the action in favor of that alternative forum.
In fact, the latter proposal would likely fare better than the former in
debate as the former would, for all intents and purposes, eradicate the
application of forum non conveniens so long as foreign plaintiffs sued
defendants in the place of their headquarters or incorporation. As to the
latter proposal, though, it would be best served if those "cases dealing
with matters that are relevant for U.S. policies in the context of foreign
trade and product injury" were enumerated with specificity.27 6 But the
value in the proposal is in bringing to the fore many of the kinds of U.S.
public interest factors discussed in Part III(A)(1)(D) above.
In fact, on the whole, a legislative effort to define and limit the applica-
tion of forum non conveniens in the United States might address what
those remedial prescriptions discussed in Part III(A)(1) of this paper
could not. That is, legislative correction might alleviate at least some,
albeit not all, of the sort of hocus pocus surrounding the current applica-
tion of the forum non conveniens doctrine. In particular, legislative cor-
rection would afford policy makers, and not just judges, the opportunity
to outline with significantly more clarity and coherency the relevant fac-
tors to be considered in the forum non conveniens analysis as well as the
touchstones for those factors.
B. RETHINKING RESPONSES TO FORUM NON CONVENIENS IN
LATIN AMERICA
The Chief Justice of the Indian Supreme Court had this to say in regard
to Indian plaintiffs' injuries at the hand of multinational corporations op-
erating in India:
When citizens of a country are victims of a tragedy because of the
negligence of a multi-national corporation, a peculiar situation arises
which calls for suitable effective machinery to articulate and effectu-
ate the grievance and demands of the victims, for which the conven-
tional adversary system could be totally inadequate. The state in
discharge of its sovereign obligation must come forward.277
The Chief Justice calls to duty the judicial and, perhaps, even legislative
machinery of the states where foreign plaintiffs are citizens, and his call to
duty is well-taken. To the extent forum non conveniens shines a light on
the inadequacies inherent in the fora in foreign plaintiffs' home countries,
it might be argued that the most logical and constructive solutions to the
dilemma would be those aimed at those alternative fora, including Latin
America.
Discussion on this front must be prefaced, however, with this caution-
ary note: "[I]rrespective of willingness and feelings of national sover-
276. Figueroa, supra note 52, at 46.
277. Anderson, supra note 84, at 215-16 (quoting Sahu v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1990
S.C. 1480).
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eignty, the courts of a developing nation, with a judicial system in
shambles, are hardly in a position to vindicate, through the judicial pro-
cess, the suffering of thousands of its own people. '278 In other words,
neither Latin American courts nor Latin American legal systems at large,
for that matter, can be expected to go it alone at this time.
There are workable mechanisms worth instituting in Latin American
courts, some that will be taken up here. The more immediate solutions to
the forum non conveniens dilemma, though, probably must remain a joint
venture. Whether it be mechanisms implemented in the United States in
tandem with mechanisms implemented in Latin American countries or,
as will be discussed in Part III(C) of this paper, bilateral and/or multilat-
eral agreements implemented at the international level, Latin American
countries cannot be expected to go it alone. That being said, Latin
America's first steps toward rectifying the effect of forum non conveniens
have been legislative, and the discussion in this Part will begin there.
1. Checkmate: Latin American Blocking Statutes
Against a wave of forum non conveniens dismissals of Latin American
plaintiffs' tort actions against U.S.-based multinational corporations oper-
ating in Latin America, several Latin American countries put forth what
have been lumped together in the common parlance as blocking statutes.
These statutes can generally be divided into two camps.
First, there are those that operate, if not to extinguish jurisdiction of
Latin American courts, at least to clarify the unavailability of those courts
once a case is dismissed from a U.S. court on the basis of forum non
conveniens.2 79 In most cases only reinforcing the jurisdictional rules dis-
cussed in Part II(B)(1) of this paper, these statutes essentially seek to
block access to Latin American courts.2 80 The Ecuadorian law provided,
for example, that "[i]f a suit were to be filed outside Ecuador, the na-
tional competence and jurisdiction of Ecuadorian courts shall be defi-
nitely extinguished. ' 281 Similarly, article 2 of Guatemalan law provided
that "[t]he personal action that a plaintiff validly establishes abroad
before a judge having jurisdiction, forecloses national jurisdiction, which
is not revived unless a new lawsuit is filed in the country, brought sponta-
neously and freely by the plaintiff. '282
278. Garro, supra note 27, at 82.
279. Figueroa, supra note 52, at 45.
280. See Dahl, supra note 77, at 43 (emphasizing that "[t]he role of blocking statutes
from [the Latin American Parliament], Ecuador and Guatemala is to clarify that
their respective jurisdictions do not offer an alternative forum;" and that "[tihese
statutes only clarify; they do not change the law").
281. Ley Interpretativa de Los Articulos 27, 28, 29, y 30 del C6digo de Procedimiento
Civil para los Casos de Competencia Concurrente Internacional [Law Interpreting
Articles 27, 28, 29 and 30 of the Code of Civil Procedure Providing for Concurrent
International Jurisdiction], Law No. 55 (Jan. 27, 1998) (Ecuador) (translated in
Dahl, supra note 77, at 48). This law was declared unconstitutional "for reasons of
form and substance." See Dahl, supra note 77, at 23.
282. Ley de Defensa de Derechos Procesales de Nacionales y Residentes [Law for the
Defense of Procedural Rights of Nationals and Residents] (May 14, 1997) (Guat.).
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The second group of statutes seek less to block access to Latin Ameri-
can courts and more to permit Latin American courts to acquire jurisdic-
tion over the dismissed action and to improve the adequacy of Latin
American courts, or at least make Latin American courts a more appeal-
ing forum for Latin American plaintiffs. In particular, these statutes en-
deavor to infuse the given Latin American country's legal system with
specific principles imported from the U.S. system and, notably, with
which U.S. corporations might be faced in a U.S. court. Generally speak-
ing, they set forth "provisions allowing local trials to utilize the rules of
foreign countries in deciding the issues raised by its citizens against for-
eign corporation defendants, instead of using local rules relating to evi-
dence, liability and awarding damages. '28 3 Some, for example, "impose
strict liability onto foreign defendants in product injury liability cases; '2 84
and others "establish that the determination of the amount of compensa-
tory damages must be made according to the same standards used by
courts in the United States. '2 85
More recent proposals for addressing the forum non conveniens di-
lemma in Latin America suggest including in Latin American statutes
provisions that would declare evidence gathered in the U.S. proceeding
to be admissible in the Latin American proceeding and/or provisions that
would "[a]lter[ ] the burden of proof by having the U.S. defendant prove
that it acted with due diligence in negligence cases, or by proving an act
of God as being the only excuse in a case of strict liability." 286
In addition to these, other measures that might be considered for inclu-
sion in Latin American statutes might be gleaned from the laundry list of
reasons Latin American plaintiffs and defendant U.S.-based multina-
tional corporations each seek to avoid their own home courts.287 For ex-
(translated in Dahl, supra note 77, at 48). Provisions contained in article 3 of this
law, which provided for posting of a bond upon resumption of jurisdiction by Gua-
temalan courts, were declared to be unconstitutional. See Dahl, supra note 77, at
23.
283. Santoyo, supra note 15, at 726.
284. Figueroa, supra note 52, at 45. See, e.g., Transnational Causes of Action (Product
Liability) Act, No. 16, § 12, 1997 (Dominica) (providing that
"[a]ny person, whether a national of or domicile, resident or incorpo-
rated in a foreign country, or otherwise carrying on business abroad, who
manufactures, produces, distributes or otherwise puts any product or
substance into the stream of commerce shall be strictly liable for any and
all injury, damage or loss, caused as a result of the use or consumption of
that product or substance")
(translated in Dahl, supra note 77, at 49).
285. Figueroa, supra note 52, at 45. See, e.g., Transnational Causes of Action (Product
Liability) Act, No. 16, § 12, 1997 (Dominica) (providing in Sections 10, 11, and 12
for award of punitive damages as well as compensatory damages in accordance
with "awards made in similar proceedings or for similar injuries in other jurisdic-
tions, in particular damages awarded in the Courts of the country with which the
defendant has a strong connection whether through residence, domicile, the trans-
action of business or the like") (translated in Dahl, supra note 77, at 50).
286. Figueroa, supra note 52, at 47.
287. Importantly, it should be underscored that proposals aimed at the Latin American
judicial systems are not, in all respects, intended to serve as some correction to
those various systems. Indeed, some of the distinctions in those systems are part
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ample, provisions might be included in Latin American legislation to (1)
permit some brand of contingency fee arrangements; (2) permit advance-
ment of costs by counsel; (3) do away with litigation taxes as a pre-condi-
tion for filing complaints; (4) do away with the British Rule regarding
payment of attorneys' fees; (5) permit more extensive pre-trial discovery,
perhaps even in accordance with U.S. procedural rules; (6) lift existing
restrictions on testimonial evidence, including especially the prohibition
on cross-examination and the exclusion of party-selected expert testi-
mony, again, perhaps in accordance with U.S. procedural rules; (7) devise
easier procedures for service of process; and finally, (7) levy awards de-
nominated in U.S. currency.
Finally, in addition to those statutes enacted in Latin American juris-
dictions, the Latin American Parliament has promulgated a Model Law
on International Jurisdiction Applicable to Tort Liability.288 That model
law, like those laws promulgated in Ecuador and Guatemala, if adopted
by a Latin American country, would block access to that country's courts
after a forum non conveniens dismissal.289 That model law also provides
for the application of damages and "pecuniary sanctions" in accordance
with "the relevant standards and amounts of the pertinent foreign
law."290
Initially, hailed as the possible checkmate 291 to forum non conveniens
dismissals of Latin American plaintiffs' tort actions, blocking statutes
have since been criticized as unnecessary, 292 "excessively focused, '293 and
even counterproductive. 294 Worse, some have already been determined
to be unconstitutional or, at the very least, "highly questionable. '295 It
has been suggested that, for all their good intentions, some contain "de-
fects . . . that could allow corporations to escape liability" 296 anyway. It
has further been noted that "[f]acing only the anti-forum non conveniens
legislation ... defendant corporations could still utilize forum non con-
and parcel of their being grounded in the civil law and, thus, by operation in
marked contrast to the U.S. common law system. The interest is in devising a
more balanced approach to adjudicating claims between citizens of those civil law
systems and juridical citizens of the U.S. common law system. What a brave new
world it would be if there could be a legal arena where Latin American plaintiffs
could say to U.S. corporations-you can run, but you cannot hide. As discussed in
Part Ill(C) of this paper, an international treaty or tribunal established to address
foreign plaintiffs' actions against multinational corporations might serve that end
best.
288. The Latin American Parliament, or PARLATINO, "is an international organiza-
tion formed by representatives of Latin American countries" and charged with
enacting "model legislation ... [which] carries only persuasive weight." Dahl,
supra note 77, at 47.
289. See Model Law on International Jurisdiction Applicable to Tort Liability, supra
note 77.
290. Id.
291. Anderson, supra note 84, at 183.
292. Garro, supra note 27, at 78.
293. Santoyo, supra note 15, at 728 (citing Anderson, supra note 84, at 215).
294. Garro, supra note 27, at 78.
295. Id.
296. Santoyo, supra note 15, at 728.
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veniens dismissals as a tactical impediment to delay the plaintiffs'
case. "297
Though not completely unfounded, putting this criticism aside, Latin
American efforts must be commended. Irrespective of their deficiencies,
these statutes are a significant step in the right direction. In fact, those
that withstand constitutional scrutiny in Latin American jurisdictions and
that aim to reshape the Latin American judicial turf are the most promis-
ing. The success of remedial prescriptions bent on forcing the hand of
U.S. courts may ultimately pale in comparison to the success of Latin
American efforts to reconfigure their judicial systems into ones willing
and capable of holding U.S.-based multinational corporations accounta-
ble for injurious conduct in Latin America.
2. Big Bonds and Even Bigger Judgments: Nicaragua's Blow to Forum
Non Conveniens in Nicaragua
Latin American legislative efforts aside, other more aggressive mecha-
nisms implemented by at least one Latin American country are enjoying
a measure of success. Indeed, Nicaragua garnered much press for its 2002
judgment ordering defendants Shell Oil Company, Dole Food Company,
and Dow Chemical to pay $489 million to over 400 banana workers for
damages allegedly caused by exposure to the pesticide DBCP.298 Impor-
tantly, plaintiffs brought their suit in Nicaragua before bringing suit in the
United States.299 And, presiding over the matter, the Nicaraguan court
set a bond of $100,000 per claimant to be paid by defendants, ultimately
levying the $489 million in damages against the absentee defendants. 300
In one commentator's opinion, the judgment "landed a crushing blow
to the doctrine of forum non conveniens. '' 30 The theory has both strate-
gic and pragmatic bases. First, "[w]ith a large judgment against the de-
fendant corporations awaiting them in Nicaragua, it is now the
corporations and not the plaintiffs who are the parties decrying the inade-
quacies of the foreign forum. ' 30 2 As such, it might be argued that in light
of their arguments on this score, defendants would be estopped from
later arguing in a U.S. court that Nicaragua is the more convenient forum
for plaintiffs' claims against them.30 3
Regardless, and most remarkable of all, is that it appears defendants
have been truly cornered. As the theory goes:
297. Id. at 732.
298. See id. at 704 (citing David Gonzalez & Samuel Lowenberg, Banana Workers Get
Day in Court, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2003, at 1C; Megan Rowling, Their Day in
Court: Nicaraguan Banana Workers May Finally Get Their Justice, IN THESE
TIMES, Aug. 11, 2003).
299. See id. at 733.
300. See id. at 729-30 (citing Gonzalez & Lowenberg, supra note 298, at 1C).
301. Id. at 730
302. Id. at 731 (citing Gonzalez & Lowenberg, supra note 298, at 1C).
303. Such an argument might be even further bolstered by the fact that defendants
refused to attend the Nicaraguan proceedings against them.
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With the advance notice of a hostile judgment in Nicaragua, the de-
fendants have no choice but to enlist the U.S. legal system for re-
lief .... By obtaining a judgment against the corporations at the
outset, the plaintiffs have preemptively attacked the defense of fo-
rum non conveniens.... Now, seeking a dismissal by the defendants
[in a U.S. action] means facing an unreceptive foreign forum that has
already rendered a most unfriendly judgment and large award in
plaintiffs' favor. The defendants have no alternative left but the U.S.
courts, the exact place the plaintiffs had been trying to reach for
countless years. 30
4
From a very broad-based policy perspective, Nicaragua's tactic may not
be the most appealing remedial prescription. It does little, for example,
to address the actual shortcomings in the forum non conveniens analysis
or to improve on any inadequacies in Nicaraguan courts. And in the in-
creasingly globalized market, where more multinational corporations will
find their way into the still-developing areas of Latin America, both a
revamping of U.S. forum non conveniens analysis and judicial reform ef-
forts in Latin America will no doubt prove to be central to protecting
Latin American plaintiffs. There is also some question as to the viability
of the Nicaraguan judgment insofar as defendants have contested the
Nicaraguan court's jurisdiction over them.30 5
All that being said, as far as interim measures go, there is no contest;
Nicaragua's was a good one.
3. Fast Track and Single Track Litigation in Latin America
Their effectiveness in actually alleviating congestion and delay is a mat-
ter of some debate, but fast track and single track litigation models uti-
lized in the context of toxic tort litigation in the United States may not be
wholly irrelevant to this discussion regarding Latin American responses
to forum non conveniens. 30 6
Generally speaking, these models afford the gravest toxic tort (ordina-
rily terminal mesothelioma) claims priority on a court's trial docket, insti-
tuting mechanisms to speed up such a case's track toward trial and, in
some instances, even assigning all such cases to a single court's docket
that has been cleared to receive such cases. 30 7 Latin American judicial
304. Santoyo, supra note 15, at 732-33.
305. See id. at 730, 732. Note that defendants' absence upon rendering of the judgment
was due to defendants' refusal to attend the Nicaraguan proceedings. See id. at
729-30 (citing Gonzalez & Lowenberg, supra note 298; Rowling, supra note 298).
306. See, e.g., Dominica C. Anderson & Kathryn L. Martin, The Asbestos Litigation in
the San Francisco Bay Area: A Paradigm of the National Asbestos Litigation Crisis,
45 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1, 16-17 (2004) (noting debate regarding whether expe-
diting trial process only serves to further clog courts' dockets by "creating a proce-
dure that moves large numbers of cases through the tort system" and, thereby,
"actually encourages more cases to be filed").
307. A recent example of such a model is actually in Scotland. See Asbestos Update:
New Fast Track System Recommended for Asbestos Cases in the Court of Session,
Edinburgh, http://www.bto.co.uk/articles/IRUarticles.htm (last visited Nov. 2,
2006) (proposing fast-track model for mesothelioma cases in Scotland pursuant to
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systems might follow suit with respect to tort claims against multinational
corporations and, thereby, address with some expediency, at least for
those cases, the problems of congestion and delay in Latin American
courts noted in Part II(B)(2) of this paper.
Granted, in many countries, the infrastructure needed to apply such
models may simply not be present. In countries, for example, where the
judge "works out of the third floor of a cinderblock building on the edge
of town[,] ... has one computer, no fax machine, no Internet connection
and no law clerks to assist with the paperwork, '30 8 the idea that matters
on his docket might be fast-tracked or that she/he, or another judge in a
like position, could be the lucky recipient of all pending tort claims
against multinational corporations, is nothing short of ludicrous.
A not entirely unworkable alternative, however, might be the legisla-
tive creation of a new and separate court in Latin American countries
charged with adjudicating tort claims against multinational corporations
and only those claims. Not unlike the federal bankruptcy courts in the
United States, jurisdiction in such a court would be subject-matter driven.
Furthermore, such a court might afford the needed room to strike a more
balanced approach to the procedure implemented in adjudication of
these claims between plaintiff citizens of civil law systems against defen-
dant juridical citizens of the U.S. common law system. Or, such a court
might better permit the implementation of U.S. "rules relating to evi-
dence, liability and awarding damages" without concern for dilution of
Latin American civil law principles if such were applied in other Latin
American courts. 30 9
C. CONCEPTUALIZING (AND RE-CONCEPTUALIZING)
INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES
In addition to those mechanisms for addressing forum non conveniens
that might be implemented in the United States and in Latin America,
there are those that might be implemented at the international level. In
particular, these include the possibility of a multilateral international
treaty on the subject, as well as consideration of the scope of existing
international agreements providing for court access and the possibility of
establishing an international tribunal to contend with foreign plaintiffs'
claims against multinational corporations causing alleged injuries in
plaintiffs' home countries.
which (1) proof dates would be fixed within six months instead of twelve months,
(2) preliminary hearings would take place six weeks before the proof date before a
judge to encourage settlement discussions and to ensure that cases are ready to
proceed to proof, (3) new powers would be granted to the judge at the preliminary
hearing to issue directions to any party to ensure that the case can proceed to
proof, and (4) instituting continuity of judges, by ensuring that the judge who pre-
sided at the preliminary hearing will also hear the proof).
308. Marlowe, supra note 105, at 318 (quoting Press, supra note 173, at 13) (describing
court in Ecuador).
309. Santoyo, supra note 15, at 726 (discussing Dominica's Transnational Causes of Ac-
tion (Product Liability) Act 1997).
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1. Open and Free: Treaties Affording Access to Courts and
Enforcement of Judgments
It may come as no surprise to learn that there exist treaties on the
books that address foreign plaintiffs' access to the courts of the signatory
parties. But it may be surprising to learn that the United States is party
to at least a handful of such treaties with Latin American countries.
There is, for example, the Treaty of Peace, Friendship, Navigation, and
Commerce of June 20, 1836, between the United States and Venezuela.
There is also the Convention of Peace, Amity, Navigation, and Com-
merce of May 31, 1825, between the United States and Columbia. And,
as one commentator observed, "[a]ccording to these treaties, the courts
of both countries shall be open and free to other's citizens 'on the same
terms which are usual and customary with the natives or citizens of the
country in which they may be." 310
This is far-reaching language, and, in fact, it seems that the very distinc-
tion between the deference afforded domestic plaintiffs' choice of forum
and that afforded foreign plaintiffs' choices of forum is in violation of
such a provision. Some plaintiffs have asserted as much. In In re Bridge-
stone/Firestone, Inc., an action comprising part of the litigation against
defendants Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. for alleged rollover tendencies
caused by their tires, defendants sought dismissal on the basis of forum
non conveniens. 311 As one commentator recounts, however, the Colom-
bian and Venezuelan "plaintiffs countered that, on the basis of certain
treaty obligations . . . [they] were entitled to a presumption of conve-
nience equal to that of resident or citizen plaintiffs," and, indeed, the
court retained jurisdiction over plaintiffs' claims. 312
It has also been argued that forum non conveniens violates the Interna-
tional Covenant of Civil and Political Rights (the Covenant), to which the
United States and most Latin American countries are signatories.313 In
particular, the Supreme Court of Texas explained that "[t]he Covenant
not only guarantees foreign citizens equal treatment in the signatories'
courts, but also guarantees them equal access to these courts. '314 The
Court reasoned that "[s]uch a guarantee is evident in article 14(1)'s lan-
guage entitling 'everyone' to a 'fair and public hearing' for the 'determi-
nation ... of his rights and obligations in a suit at law.'"315
This is but a short list of relevant international instruments, and forum
non conveniens would not be resolved as to countries not signatories to
these or like treaties. But even these few are indicative of one thing:
there may be some headway to be made in derailing a forum non con-
veniens dismissal by relying on bilateral agreements or even the larger
310. Gomez, supra note 137, at 295.
311. In reBridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 190 F. Supp. 2d at 1128.
312. Gomez, supra note 137, at 295.
313. See Dahl, supra note 77, at 31.
314. Id. (citing Dubai Petroleum Co. v. Kazi, 12 S.W.3d 71, 82 (Tex. 2000)).
315. Id.
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Covenant. In fact, to the extent possible, Latin American countries
should be encouraged to devise such bilateral agreements with the
United States and, at the very least, to ensure they are party to the
Covenant.
That being said, though, according to one surveyor, "[c]urrently, there
are no international treaties providing for the international transfer of
cases or addressing the issue of convenience in international disputes. ' '3 16
And some do insist that the best mechanism for resolving the forum non
conveniens dilemma is an international treaty specifically on the subject
between the United States and Latin American countries-a direct hit, so
to speak.317 Given the divided opinion as to forum non conveniens both
within the United States and between the United States and Latin Ameri-
can countries, it does seem a treaty on the subject would be the most
feasible and most fruitful mechanism for finding compromise. Negotia-
tion of the treaty terms would in itself consolidate discourse on the sub-
ject to a single forum where participating countries would be able to
voice their various concerns and, in the end, hammer out the details of an
instrument suited to address those concerns.3 18
Such a treaty might, for example: (1) be narrowly tailored to apply only
to tort claims between plaintiff citizens of one signatory and defendant
citizens of another signatory; (2) establish access to the courts of both
signatories involved in an action at plaintiff's election based on specified
grounds, such as where the injury occurred or where the defendant is
headquartered or has its principal office; (3) confirm jurisdiction of both
signatories' courts; (4) pin down the precise guidelines, if any, for any
deference to be afforded plaintiffs' choice of forum; (5) outline with spec-
ificity the grounds, if any, for determining on what basis a chosen forum
would be determined to be more or less convenient, including grounds
that take into consideration the type of case involved and what forum is
most equipped to handle that type of matter; (6) outline the means of
determining the applicable substantive law and damages standards; and
(7) set forth means for the handling of discovery and evidence as well as
other procedural details such as service of process. In other words, such a
treaty would be relatively all-encompassing, addressing with a much-
needed pragmatism the concerns that forum non conveniens has given
rise to.319
316. Figueroa, supra note 52, at 42.
317. See id. at 46.
318. As with the legislative proposals discussed in Part III(A)(2), however, care would
need to be given that the end product of any treaty negotiations not be marred by
emasculating compromise
319. Along these lines, the Organization of American States Inter-American Juridical
Committee put forth a "Proposal for an Inter-American Convention on the Effects
and Treatment of the 'Forum Non Conveniens."' Figueroa, supra note 52, at 46.
As one commentator notes, among other provisions, "[a]rticle 22 of the proposed
treaty would allow a Latin American court with proper jurisdiction to decline a
case 'if a court of another State has jurisdiction and is clearly more appropriate to
resolve the dispute.'" Id. That proposal has been criticized, however, as failing to
address the fundamental concerns raised by the forum non conveniens doctrine, a
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Indeed, though still forum non conveniens would not be resolved as to
countries not signatories to such a treaty, according to one commentator,
such international cooperation would do more than just treat forum non
conveniens, arguably working to soothe a deeper, more substantial prob-
lem by "caus[ing] a general improvement in the legal and judicial systems
of concerned Latin American countries, possibly by means of harmoniza-
tion of laws and procedures, uniform application of comity principles, and
mutual recognition and enforcement of foreign awards. '320 Such would,
indeed, be an accomplishment.
Aside from a new treaty, another possibility is the expansion of existing
multilateral agreements, such as the North American Free Trade Agree-
ment (NAFTA), to include access to the courts of NAFTA's signatories
for "individuals harmed by NAFTA-based manufacturing. '321 The pro-
posal is an exceedingly viable one insofar as, for better or worse, the insti-
tution of preferential trade agreements like NAFLA is on the rise, such
that new opportunities for inclusion of such provisions are cropping up
with a certain frequency. Trade-based bargaining power held by Latin
American countries in the context of agreements like NAFTA, however
slight, might serve as precisely the ammunition Latin American countries
need to effect such a change in existing agreements or to inject such a
provision into future agreements.
Finally, a treaty instrument is precisely the vehicle to take up the prob-
lem of the enforceability of judgments rendered against U.S.-based mul-
tinational corporations by Latin America courts and to afford access to
those U.S.-based multinational corporations' U.S. assets. Notably, the
new Hague Convention might have done it, providing as it does for the
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments.322 That particular
Convention, however, not only excludes from its parameters consumer
actions and personal injury claims,323 it also extends exclusively to judg-
ments entered in cases where there is "choice of court agreement" 324-an
unfortunate failing.
Overall, however, there are a bevy of treaty-type measures that might
serve to dismantle the looming forum non conveniens doctrine. The test,
of course, for Latin American countries will be in actually negotiating
provision that would seem to do little more than reverse the flow of forum non
conveniens dismissals. See id. For an example of an instrument addressing matters
of jurisdiction, see MERCOSUR (Arg.-Braz.-Para.-Uru.): Protocol of Buenos
Aires on International Jurisdiction in Disputes Relating to Contracts, Aug. 5, 1994,
36 I.L.M. 1263 (1997) (setting forth principles regarding subject matter jurisdiction
and competent courts in various contractual situations).
320. Figueroa, supra note 52, at 47.
321. Nico, supra note 12, at 347.
322. See Ronald A. Brand, The New Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agree-
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such provisions and in the danger of expending what are all too fre-
quently limited bargaining chips in order to acquire such provisions.
2. Toward an International Tribunal
The final remedial prescription proposed by this paper is that of an
international tribunal established solely for the purpose of adjudicating
tort claims of plaintiffs arising out of injuries allegedly caused by the acts
or omissions of a corporation operating in plaintiffs' home countries but
headquartered and/or incorporated elsewhere, including the United
States. It is a tall order and not likely a possibility anywhere near the
realm of realization, but it is nevertheless a proposal very much worth
broaching.
Indeed, there is indelible value in the notion of a functioning interna-
tional tribunal in this context. As one commentator so aptly observed,
"[a] responsible world economy must be attended by universal standards
for multinational accountability, which demands consensus and collabo-
ration from the international community acting on grounds of good faith
and good neighborliness rather than exploitation of underdeveloped na-
tions for profit. ' 32 5 There can be no surer venue for achieving those goals
than an independent international judiciary.
In fact, as one commentator opined:
The idea that international judicial cooperation may serve our na-
tional interests has been recognized by American courts from the
time of Justice Story, who noted that "mutual interest and utility"
required that courts in the United States recognize foreign law and
vice versa, right up to the modem U.S. Supreme Court, which has
noted "[w]e cannot have trade and commerce in world markets and
international waters exclusively on our terms, governed by our laws,
and resolved in our courts" and that a "self-regarding respect" for
the operation of the international legal system sometimes requires
deference to foreign laws and tribunals.326
Removed from parochial influences and burdened by none of the com-
peting interest elements under which the forum non conveniens analysis
might forever labor, an international tribunal would be ideally suited to
the task.
IV. CONCLUSION
This paper has endeavored to enumerate and expound upon certain
systemic problems inherent in the forum non conveniens analysis and to
explore the impact forum non conveniens dismissals have on Latin Amer-
ican plaintiffs' claims as well as on corporate liability and, ultimately, cor-
325. Lyons, supra note 92, at 731-32.
326. Jenny S. Martinez, Towards an International Judicial System, 56 STAN. L. REV. 429,
471 (2003) (quoting JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS
§ 35; Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1972); Romero v. Int'l
Terminal Operation Co., 358 U.S. 354, 382-83 (1959)).
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porate accountability. This paper has endeavored, through that
discussion, to demonstrate the formidable basis for implementing a
change in the forum non conveniens application. Finally, this paper has
sought to identify some remedial prescriptions for contending with the
problems inherent in the forum non conveniens analysis and its undesir-
able impact.
The current application of forum non conveniens by U.S. courts, before
whom Latin American plaintiffs have asserted their claims, frequently
serves only one end: dismissal of those plaintiffs' claims. As a conse-
quence of such dismissal, any likelihood that those plaintiffs will find re-
dress for their injuries is effectively obviated, and U.S.-based
multinational corporations are effectively shielded against liability for
those injuries. Those consequences risk entirely too much to be toler-
ated, whether viewed from the U.S. perspective, the Latin American per-
spective, or from the perspective of the international community. As
stated at this paper's beginning, where there's a will, there's a way, and
with regard to remedying forum non conveniens, there is both.
